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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
"At the intersection between ethics and things, Levinas and Heidegger meet."l
This quotation occurs in Silvia Benso's article entitled "Of Things Face-To-Face
with Levinas Face-To-Face with Heidegger: Prolegomena to a Metaphysical Ethics of
Things." It encapsulates Benso's beliefthat Levinas and Heidegger can be brought
together in an e.ffort to develop an •ethics of things'. Benso's aim of developing such
an'ethics of things' seems implausible given the position ofboth Heidegger and Levinas.
Clearly, Benso wants to establish an 'ethics of things' in which human beings have a
responsibility to Nature, the environment, and all things. Moreover, she contends that
human beings' proper response should take the fonn of "the touching mode of
tendemess."2 If her goal is to establish something like a 'tree-hugging' and/or 'love of
Nature' 'environmental ethics', then Benso is destined to fail given the thinkers she is
drawing upon. While Heidegger's response to such a modem concern is temporally
inaccessible, Levinas plainly denies any such endeavor. In an interview with graduate
1 Silvia Benso, "Of Things Face-To-Face with Levinas Face-To-Face with
Heidegger: Prolegomena to a Metaphysical Ethics ofThings," Philosophy Today, 40
(1996), 132.
2 Op. Cit., p. 137.
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students in 1986, Levinas grants that ethical consideration (based on suffering) "extends to
all living beings"3 but that ethics - which involves an Other rather than simply oneself-
is reserved for human beings. The extension of ethics to non-living entities is
inconceivable based upon Levinas.
Though her end may be dubious, Benso's means are philosophically interesting.
Unlike most writers on Heidegger and Levinas, she attempts to unify rather than isolate
the two thinkers in order to develop her own original theory - a so-called 'ethics of
things'. She accomplishes this unlikely union through supplementing one with the other
- Levinas' concept of ethics is supplemented with Heidegger's conception of things.
Although she admits that the "concrete elaboration of such an ethics [an ethics of things]
will be left to a future project'''~ and that the "concept ... still awaits philosophical
thematization,"5 this thesis will show that such a project, though admirable, is futile. The
aim of this thesis is twofold: its 'negative' aspect is to refute Benso's proposed
development of an 'ethics of things' and its 'positive' aspect is to analyze how a subject is
individualized. Both of these aspects will be based upon the thought of Heidegger and
Levinas. In the end, Benso's 'ethics of things' fails not because of an incompatibility
between Heidegger and Levinas but because Levinas' conception of ethics does not
extend so far as to include things.
3 Robert Bernasconi and David Wood, ed., The Provocation ofLevinas:
Rethinking the Other (New York: Routledge, 1988), p. 172.
4 Benso, p. 134.
S Benso, p. 140.
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A Reading ofBenso's Article
In her article, Benso takes a position which refuses to endorse either extreme of
the relationship between Heidegger and Levinas - Levinas is neither a complement nor
an opponent ofHeidegger. They are not the same - "[d]espite the common rootedness
in Hussed's phenomenology, their encounter is not that of two Aristotelian mends; nor is
the one the forerunner of the other.,,6 For Benso, "Levinas and Heidegger do not
complement each other, either existentially or historically or philosophically."7 On the
other hand, they are not "in absolute opposition ... opposition being only the counterpart
to complementation."ll Either position - whether it be complementary or oppositional-
reduces the Other to the Same (either Levinas to Heidegger or to anti-Heidegger). The
concern for such a reduction has its origins in Levinas' criticism ofHeidegger. Benso is
quite right when she states that a "complement comes from the interior of a common




9 Levinas makes a distinction between the Other and the other. While this can be
understood as the distinction between persons and things, it does not get to the heart of
the matter. The term 'other' signifies something which, though it appears to be 'other-
than', can be reduced to the Same. The term 'Other', however, cannot be reduced to the
Same. Many commentators use the tenus interchangeably, but this thesis will try to
maintain the Levinasian usage. The distinction between Other and other is captured by the
Levinasian term 'alterity' which will be explored in greater detail below.
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authority from the exterior, opening the path for further development."lo For Benso;
Heidegger and Levinas "stand on their own as two separate, autonomous philosophical
figures"u whose supplementation would be an original 'further development'.
Benso attempts to create a position that is capable of~'preserving differences ...
[without] instituting an oppositional confrontation between Levinas and Heidegger."l~
Derrida's notion of 'supplementation' provides Benso with an account capable of
preserving each thinker's autonomy; "As supplementing each other, Levinas and
Heidegger remain external, exterior, other, each not defined as the other than the Same.,,13
Derrida warns that the "structure ofsupplementation is quite complex."14
Supplementation involves the notion of'differance' - "sameness which is not
identical."lS In supplementation, the signifier not only represents an-other absent signifier
but also replaces it. According to Benso, "two different meanings cohabit, oddly although
necessarily, in the notion of the supplement. The supplement is surplus, an addition ...
Yet the supplement is not only an excess.... Its addition aims at replacement."16 Benso's




14 Jacques Derrida, Speech and Phenomenon (Evanston: Northwestern University
Press, 1973), p. 89.
IS Op. Cit., p. 129.
16 Benso, p. 133.
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view aims at replacing both Heidegger and Levinas by supplementing them with each
other.
As the quotation which precedes this chapter indicates, Benso's proposed
supplementation occurs at the intersection between ethics and things. What makes such
an addition (as well as a replacement) possible is a lack on the part of both Levinas and
Heidegger. In the views ofboth men, "there is a remainder of being that is not described,
that is forgotten in ... [each of their respective] meditation[s]."J7 According to Benso,
"there are no things for Levinas.... [and] there is no ethics in Heidegger, at least
according to the most cornmon reading."18 Thus, if one were to place them "face-to-face
in a confrontation neither of them would advocate enthusiastically, the result is a ...
double negation - non-ethics and non-things.,,19 Moreover, each one provides what the
other lacks. Benso's supplementation ofLevinas and Heidegger is possible because "each
of them offers the remainder that the other lacks.,,20 To the supplementation, Levinas can
offer ethics and Heidegger can offer things. Thus, the double negation is also "a double
17 Ibid.
18 Benso, p. 132.
19 Ibid.
20 Gp. cit., p. 133.
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affirmation - ethics. and thingS."21 What Benso calls the "ethics ofthings is the outcome
of the supplementarity ofLevinas and Heidegger."22
The composite tenn 'ethics ofthings' contains "non-traditional"n notions ofboth
'ethics' and 'things'. For Benso's supplementation, "ethics cannot be traditional ethics in
any of its formulations (utilitarian, deontologica1, virtue-oriented), and things cannot be
traditional things (objects opposed to a subject)."2. The tenn 'non-tradition' is an apt
description ofboth Levinas' ethics and Heid,egger's objects. There is no room in a post-
Nietzschean and post-Heideggerian landscape for overarching (traditional) ethical systems.
The hermeneutics of suspicion (of which Heidegger is a part and with which Levinas must
deal) have "compromis[ed] irremediably the possibility of a 'big' ethics in the Aristotelian,
or even Kantian, sense ofan ethical system able to give laws to reality by imposing norms
and prohibitions to be respected.,,2' The result is what Benso calls "residual ethics,,26-
'small' ethical systems devoted to only a potion ofreaIity. The modem areas of medical,
legal, environmental, and business ethics have been "deprived ofthe possibility of a
holistic approach to reality ... [and as a result] try to bridle at least that small part of
21 Gp. cit., p. 132.
22 Gp. cit., p. 133.
23 Gp. cit., p. 132.
24 Ibid.
25 Gp. cit., p. 134.
26 Ibid.
7
reality within which they constitute th.emselves."21 Such 'small' ethics are content to
operate within their own "minimum realm,,28 and spend their time "seek[ing] common
values and principles able to give that part of reality order and rationality, upon which
those who belong to the specific realm can ground their activity.,,29 These sorts of 'small'
ethics - which are a sort of"/ocus m;nimum,,3lJ - fail because oftheir structure. They
attempt to be "a practical guide, or a moral ought, or a science ofmores, traditions,
behaviors ... [and attempt] to posit rules and values as conditions for the development of
human beings; of providing its followers with static sets ofnonns to direct moral
actions.,,31 It is precisely because of its nonnativity that ethics fails. These sorts of
traditional ethics are "necessarily limited, not only with respect to the domain in which
they rule, but also in tenns ofcredibility."32 The major failure of ethics in the twentieth
century is the often repeated example of Auschwitz. In an interview with graduate
students from the University ofWarwick, Levinas concurs with Benso on this point: "The
essential problem is: can we speak of an absolute commandment after Auschwitz? Can we







33 Bernasconi and Wood, p. 176.
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"How can one philosophize, how can one write within the memory of Auschwitz . . . it is
this thought that traverses, that bears, the whole ofLevinas' philosophy and that he
proposes to us without saying it.,,34
In the wake of the collapse of traditional ethics, Benso endorses phenomenological
ethics. This type of ethics is expansive rather than limited, 'big' rather than 'small'.
Phenomenological ethics is based on "not an abstract principle or value, but reality itself:
its concreteness, the gravity ofthings."3s Thus, "good is defined in terms ofwhat
preserves the maximum of reality from destruction. What is bad is what works against
reality, for its destruction and annihilation."36
There are two candidates for more traditional categories under which
phenomenological ethics might fall: metaphysics and ontology. While Heidegger criticizes
the term 'metaphysics' Levinas criticizes the term 'ontology'. As a result, Benso is
hesitant to call the phenomenological ethics characterized by an 'ethics of things' as either
metaphysical or ontological. Instead, she finds what she believes is common to both;
"Both metaphysics and ontology ... are characterized by the same concern: that of not
being oblivious to differences.'>37 It is the nature of the difference which distinguishes
metaphysics from ontology as well as Heidegger's enterprise from that of Levinas. Both
34 Richard A. Cohen, ed., Face to Face with Levinas (Albany: State University of
New York Press, 1986), p. 50.
3S Benso, p. 134.
36 Ibid.
37 Op. cit., p. 135.
9
metaphysics and Levinas are concerned with "the difference between being and beyond
being"38 while ontology and Heidegger are concerned with "the difference between Being
and beings."39 The name each of these thinkers applies to this difference is also distinct;
"[f]or Levinas, the difference is transcendence; for Heidegger... [it] is rather what, with a
Derridian expression, one could call diffe"ance, the giving of itself of being, which can
only give itself in beings, but always withdraws from them."4O Benso, however, eradicates
these distinctions by maintaining that "Levinas reproduced at a second order of reality
what Heidegger enacts at a first order: horizontal verticality in Heidegger (what we have
called differrance), vertical verticality in Levinas. But the structural movement remains
the same. ,,41
Benso finds structural similarities between both Levinas' metaphysics and
Heidegger's ontology in the work ofDescartes. What Descartes has suggested in the
Third Meditation is that there is a difference between "formal reality and objective reality .
. . between reality as it is and its perception.,,42 According to Benso, metaphysics could be
considered the difference "between the order ofbeing and the order of knowing.







consciousness.,,43 For Heidegger, however, knowing is one particular - perhaps the
primary - mode ofbeing. This does not mean that Heidegger lacks such a distinction.
For Heidegger, as well as Levinas, "reality is greater than what can be grasped ofit."'"
Although Benso bases this statement on "the structure of the Fourfold,,4s the same can be
maintained according to Being in. Being and Time. In particular, Benso maintains that
what exceeds consciousness for Heidegger is things and for Levinas is the Other. For
Descartes, the idea of God exceeds consciousness. For Levinas it is "the Other as person,
who is always the idea of the Other"46 that exceeds consciousness just as Heidegger
maintains that things exceed consciousness. Given the affinity to Descartes, "ethics can be
said to be metaphysical, whether it involves the relation with the beyond-being (Levinas)
or with Being (Heidegger). Metaphysics becomes transversal to the notions of
transcendence, immanence, or differrance. It describes what epistemology cannot
achieve, what only the ethical dimension can approach. ,,47
From Descartes, Benso takes the idea ofwhat exceeds consciousness (the idea of
God), applies it to the metaphysics ofLevinas and to the ontology ofHeidegger, and
arrives at her conception ofa phenomenological ethics. Given this understanding, Benso







with its metaphysical nature and distinguishes it from other 'small' ethics. According to
Benso, "metaphysical ethics receives its orientation not from the subject, or from its
fonnulation ofvalues ... but from what epistemology cannot reach, from the Other, or
from the Other of the Other, from the things themselves."48 The non-traditional nature of
ethics is that it "is a locative description, not a normative procedure. Ethics opens up a
space,,49 where the Other can be encountered. Rather than a prescriptive list, ethics
amounts to "a response that does not proceed from the individual herlhimself ... to
respond (or not to respond) to an appeal coming from the exterior."so Ifethics is a
response to Otherness then Benso wants to apply it not only to the Other which is another
person (Levinas) but also to things (Heidegger). Ethics is "the place where Otherness can
be encountered ... [it is] where the locus ofthe Fourfold can be inhabited."n The
authority of the "ethical imperative comes from Otherness, from its right to existence as a
fonn of reality. The only imperative is the injunction to let this Other be."s2
According to Benso, what marks ethics as metaphysi.cal is non-indifference to
difference. Thus, both Heidegger and Levinas are included in a metaphysical /
phenomenological ethics because they contain elements which are 'other' - Heidegger
because of his concept of things and Levinas because of his concept of ethics as a response
48 Op. Cit, p. 136.
49 Op. cit., p. 134.




to the Other (person). Although Benso's consideration of metaphysical ethics contains a
predominance ofLevinasian concepts (the Other, ethics as response, exteriority, etc.), she
maintains that "Levinas need[s] to be supplemented by Heidegger."s3 Because of an
apparent lack in Levinas - that otherness is restricted to other persons - there is a need
for his thought to be supplemented by that ofHeidegger. As Benso points out, "[n]ot
only the Other, but also the Other of the Other must become part of philosophical
discourse for that discourse to achieve the level ofmetaphysicity it advocates."s4 Benso
treats the work ofLevinas as an "exemplar ofethics ... a model, a paradigm, an
illustration."ss But his paradigm is in need ofexpansion since "a paradigm is not self-
sufficient and all-inclusive.,,'6 Because it provides a space for the examination of the
Other, Benso contends that the work ofLevinas allows for consideration of"other
Othernesses."s7 Levinas restricts the term 'Other' to the other person and this
"obliterate[s] another form of Othemess, which is different from the Otherness of the
other person, and whose presence is less apparent, less evident, less loud~ the Otherness of
what Levinas's ethics neglects: things."s. It is the notion of the otherness of things that
Benso hopes to gain from Heidegger. With the supplementation ofLevinas with
S3 Ibid.
S4 Ibid.





Heidegger, the resulting "ethics of things may take its move from the ethics of the Other
(person), but its truth is independent from the Other (person). It lies in the reality of the
things themselves. The ethics of things reaches further than Levinas's ethics, even if it
may receive an inspiration from that ethics."S9
As has been shown above, the supplementation ofLevinas and Heidegger requires
that both be joined in a metaphysical union: that the concept of metaphysics be understood
as a non-indifference to difference so as to allow Levinas' concept of the otherness of
persons be joined with Heidegger's concept ofthe otherness ofthings. Moreover, as has
been stated above, what distinguishes Levinas from Heidegger is the precise nature ofthe
difference inherent in their thought - beyond being for the former, and between Being
and beings for the latter. Benso is aware that "difficulties arise in the project of extending
Levinas's notion ofethics to Heidegger's concept of things ... [not the least ofwhich is]
the distinction between transcendence and irnmanence/differance."6O Benso contends that
this "opposition between transcendence and immanence ... should not be thought in
terms of an antinomy.,,61 Yet the fact remains that for Levinas the "Other is beyond being
... [but for Heidegger] Things are not beyond being. Ifanything, they are in being. ,,62
Benso maintains that "in the differences [between Levinas and Heidegger] there
may be elements of similarity, without yielding to identity but rather maintaining
59 Ibid.
60 Ibid.
61 Op. cit., p. 139.
62 Ibid.
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equivocity."63 In order to accomplish supplementation, she contends that Heidegger's
notion ofimrnanence/dif/erance ('is a case of reversed immanence, which grants some
fonn oftranscendence"64 similar to that ofLevinas. What Benso calls "circular ringing"6~
is "what Heidegger calls the ontological difference, Being is beyond the thing in which it
gives itself, so that [it] may appear as reversed immanence, [though it] is not properly
transcendence although [it] is dif/erance.,,66 While the Other (person) in Levinas has
height, "the Other as thing has the open circularity of differing"67 in Heidegger.
In order to overcome this apparent difficulty in supplementing Levinas and
Heidegger, Benso employs a "torsion, which is not a dis-tortion."61 The 'torsion' that is
required is to equate height with depth. For Levinas "the voice of the ethical Other comes
from on high ... In Heidegger, there is no height in things, although there is a depth in
them.,,69 Although persons and things are united in otherness, their positions remain to be
equated. This is accomplished, according to Benso, because "[t]hings and humans both






68 Op. cit., p. 138.
69 Op. cit., pp. 138-139.
700p. cit., p. 139.
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Benso does is equate the depth of things as an inversion ofheight (as is the case with the
other person). Things do "not appeal from on high, but from below. The lowness is
height, as the height of the Other (person) is also a lowness in the destitution of the
Other.,,71 In the supplementation ofLevinas and Heidegger, things would also maintain
the structure of the ethical relationship with another person as outlined by Levinas. As in
the relationship with the Other person, things "are both Master - they obsess the I with
the authority ofa constant presence; they are always there - and hostage - they are
frail, dependent on continuous protection; their existence is the frailty ofa reality always in
danger of being destroyed."n Moreover, such a relationship is also asymetrical; "[a]s with
the Other (person), despite the fact that things apparently do not stand on high, there is no
reciprocity between the things and the 1.'>73
Benso's project to develop an ethics of things depends upon her successful
supplementation ofLevinas and Heidegger. The supplementation process is catalyzed by
a view of metaphysics as a non-indifference to otherness and ethics as a place for that
otherness to manifest. Primarily from Levinas she takes the concept of ethics and the
otherness of the Other (person); from Heidegger she takes the concept of the otherness of
things. Thus:
The expression 'ethics of things,' as the result of the supplementarity of
Levinas and Heidegger, acquires a double meaning: it is afthings, as the





and the receptacle of the Fourfold, and from their receptivity can appeal to
humans to dwell by them. But it is of things also in the sense that humans
are compeUed by things to respond. to the demands placed upon them and
shape their behavior in accordance to the inner mirroring of things. Things
signify both a subject and an object for ethics. Of things means thus the
directionality ofa double movement: that which moves out from the things
to reach the I and the Other, and that which., in response to the first, moves
from the I and the Other to reach the things and to be concerned by them.
The first movement is that of the demand or the appeal that things place on
human beings by their mere impenetrable presencing there. It is the thingly
side of the ethics of things. The second is that of tenderness, as the
response to the demand and the properly human configuration of the ethics
of things. Tenderness represents the future ofa metaphysical ethics, that
is, an ethics that is concerned not only with persons, but also with things in
their Otherness.74
Preliminary Response to Benso
Benso's approach of taking both Heidegger and Levinas together is admirable.
However, along with the Derridian concept of supplementation Benso imports an alarming
tendency of deconstruction: acceptance without criticism. According to Benso, "Criticism
is not the weapon of the supplement, nor is it its goal. The absence of criticism also
renders the need for an apology unnecessary."7~ Critical evaluation and analysis playa
necessary role in any intellectual endeavor. The use of a device like' supplementation'
does not absolve one from this responsibility. Nor does it justify an avoidance of
contextual analysis - if both criticism and justification (apology) are ruled-out, then
compliance or deviance from a given text cannot be ascertained. Moreover, Levinas
74 Op. cit., pp. 139-140.
7~ Op. Cit., p. 133.
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contends that criticism is part of language - it is more than an 'act", it is a relationship
between the same and the Other. The "need to enter into a relation with someone . . . is
what we call the necessity of critique.... [C]riticism ... is the word ofa living being
speaking to a living being" (LR, 147-148). Criticism is a relationship in language between
persons. The role of criticism is the "integrat[ion of] the inhuman work of the artist into
the human world" (LR, 142) ofrelationship and language.
In her article, there are several examples ofBenso's acceptance without criticism.
One of the most glaring errors is the statement that for Levinas "the Other as person. . . is
always the idea ofthe Other.,,76 Levin.as clearly states that the encountering of an other
person is constantly "exceeding the idea ofthe other in me . .. [and that this] mode does
not consist in figuring as a theme under my gaze" (TI, 50). Moreover, the exceeding of
the idea of the other "will not be a knowledge, because through knowledge, whether one
wants it or not. the object is absorbed by the subject and duality disappears" (TO, 41).
That is, if the Other is always the idea of the Other as Benso claims. then the Other is
reduced to the Same. Elsewhere Levinas says that "the relation to the other breaks with
the model of the subject taking cognizance ofan object" (EI, 65) which repudiates the
claim that the Other is always the idea of the Other.
Although this example may be taken as an isolated error, a deeper understanding
ofLevinas' distinction between ontology and metaphysics would have prevented it. In a
section of Totality and Infinity entitled "Metaphysics Precedes Ontology" Levinas
maintains that "Knowledge or theory . . . comprehension . . . is a way of approaching the





known being such that its alterity with regard to the knowing being vanishes" (TI,42).
That is, knowledge reduces the Other to the Same. One ofthe ways this is accomplished
is "through a third tenn, a neutral term, which itself is not a being . . . This third. term may
appear as a concept thought. Then the individual that exists abdicates into the general that
is thought" (TI, 42). Ifthe Other is always the idea ofthe Other, then its alterity is
eliminated, it is reduced to the Same, and no longer is other.
The omission ofLevinas' distinction between ontology and metaphysics allows
Benso to categorize both Heidegger and Levinas as metaphysical based upon a weak
reading of the concept ofotherness. It seems that any otherness / difference is sufficient
for Benso to proclaim a similarity; the same, however, cannot be said for Heidegger or
Levinas. A deeper reading ofLevinas reveals that there is a distinction between otherness
and alterity - the former being reserved for otherness which can be reduced to the same
and the latter being reserved for otherness resistant to such a reduction. According to
Levinas, Heidegger utilizes the concept of difference rather than alterity. This distinction
also relates to Benso's characterization of 'metaphysical ethics'. Her summation of
metaphysics as a non-indifference to difference as well as the criteria for evaluation
(whether it preserves or destroys reality) is broad enough to cover over the distinction
between an ethical respect of alterity and a cognitive / ontological 'letting-be'.
Many ofBenso's claims are based upon structural analysis rather than analysis of
content. For example, a structural analysis of 'excess' or 'beyond' allows her to contend
that there is sufficient similarity between the Other as person and the other as thing
because both exceed consciousness. The distinction drawn by both Heidegger and
I
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Levinas between things and people is thus subverted. Moreover, Reither the Heidegger of
Being and Time nor Levinas would claim that things exceed our consciousness. In
addition, Benso claims an 'equivocity' of things and persons based upon the structure of
ethics as the place where otherness can be encountered. Moreover, Benso draws a
structural correlation (asymmetry) between the relationship between a person and a thing
in Heidegger and Levinas' relationship between a person and the Other. There are
structural similarities between the asymmetrical relationship between a person and a thing
as well as between a person and the Other. However, the exact nature of the imbalance is
different.
One of the best candidates for a structural analysis is the difference between
Levinas' ethical height and Heidegger's ontological difference. This is a fitting area in
which Benso is able to exercise her structural analysis since it is contained in a spatial
metaphor. On the surface of it, a claim that depth is equivalent to inverted height seems
plausible. Yet a closer examination ofLevinas' metaphor will reveal the flaw in such
thinking. Benso maintains that a thing for Heidegger contains depth - that is, it is
impenetrability (to one degree or another) to comprehension. The height which a person
contains for Levinas is not only its impenetrability but also its status as absolutely other -
its alterity. The Other is unknowable because it exceeds our attempts to contain it.
At one point, Levinas likens the Other to the "curvature of ... space [that] inflects
distance into elevation" (TI, 291). The space to which he is referring is Heidegger's
notion ofBeing - within which one may encounter others and things. This space is two-




universe is Dasein and the boundary is marked out by that particular Dasein's death.
Anything which occurs in this space bears a relationship to Dasein through a referential
totality.
What Levinas does is introduce a third-dimension into Heideggerian space.
According to this metaphor, Heidegger's world is comparable to Abbot's "Flatland".
What Levinas proposes with his conception of the Other is a three-dimensional object
interjected into a two-dimensional world. Suppose, for example, that the Other is a
sphere. From the perspective of the two-dimensional world (Heidegger) the sphere would
appear to be a dot just like any other (Dasein). But it cannot be contained or even known
from the two-dimensional perspective - a perspective incapable of perceiving height, it
would convert it into distance. The third dimension which the Other has is the ethical
dimension. It is not that the Other cannot be represented as a dot (concept, Being,
Dasein) it is that it overflows such a representation because it is more than that. Given
this understanding, the' equivocity' of height with depth obliterates the distinction
between the two and does amount to a 'dis-tortion'. In the end, 'circular differing' in
Heidegger is not 'height' in Levinas.
Just as a weak reading of otherness allowed Benso to develop her argument, a
weak reading of demand / appeal and response allows her to contend that things, as well
as other people, are capable of this. A deeper consideration of 'things' is forthcoming.
Such an analysis will show that Benso's claim that Levinas is in need of supplementation
because he has no adequate concept of things results from an inaccurate reading of
Levinas (and results in misstatements). These may prove to be more than mere
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'difficulties' arising from the supplementation ofLevinas and Heidegger; they may prove
to be fatal flaws.
CHAPTERll
ETInCS
Benso's supplementation ofLevinas and Heidegger rests upon the claim that
Levinas has a concept of ethics which Heidegger lacks but Heidegger has a concept of
things which Levinas lacks. According to Benso, "there is ethics in Levinas, even ifhis
notion of ethics extends only to the other person (certainly the other man, hopefully, also
the other woman and child). Conversely, there is no ethics in Heidegger, at least
according to the most common reading. ,,77 Levinas defines ethics as "the extreme
exposure and sensitivity of one subjectivity to another.,,78 Elsewhere he defines it in the
following way:
We name this calling into question ofmy spontaneity by the presence of the
Other ethics. The strangeness of the Other, his irreducibility to the I, to my
thought and my possession, is precisely accomplished as a calling into
question of my spontaneity, as ethics. Metaphysics, transcendence, the
welcoming of the other by the same, of the Other by me, is concretely
77 Benso, p. 132. Benso's attempt to impugn Levinas on the basis of a perceived
misogyny - by claiming that Levinas' concept of the Other is 'hopefully' applicable to
women and children - is unwarranted. Levinas considers, at length, the role of the
feminine as one example ofalterity and specifically includes "the stranger, the widow, and
the orphan" (TI, 77) in his ethics. There is nothing gender-specific in Levinas' definition
of ethics. Any minor usage ofmasculine personal pronouns is overshadowed by the
overwhelming use of the gender-neutral term "Other".
78 Cohen, p. 29.
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produced as the calling into question ofthe same by the other, that is, as
the ethics that accomplishes the critical essence ofknowledge. (TI, 43).
As Colin Davis observes, "the whole philosophy of Totality andInfinity is contained in
embryo in this passage.,,79 This chapter on ethics will explore many ofLevinas, concepts
including: the Other, a1terity, solitude, exposure, language, and call.
Levinas' Ethics
Ethics in the Levinasian sense rests upon the relationship between a self(the Same)
and an Other. According to Davis, the "distinction between other and Other (I 'Autre, or
its personalized form Autrui) may appear trivial, but it is nevertheless indispensable to
Levinas's thinking."ao As noted above, the former refers to otherness which can be
converted into the same, while the latter is reserved for otherness resistant to such a
reduction. Thus, the Other is completely other - "something else entirely . .. [it is]
absolutely other" (TI, 33). For this type of otherness, Levinas reserves the term 'alterity'.
In an effort to elucidate the concept of alterity, Levinas states the following:
The alterity of the Other does not depend on any quality that would
distinguish him from me, for a distinction of this nature would precisely
imply between us that community of genus which already nullifies alterity.
And yet the Other does not purely negate the I; total negation, ofwhich
murder is the temptati.on and the attempt, refers to an antecedent relation.
The relation between the Other and me, which draws forth in his
79 Colin Davis, Levinas: An Introduction (Notre Dame: University ofNotre Dame
Press, 1996), p. 36.
10 Ibid.
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expression, issues neither in number nor in concept. The Other remains
infinitely transcendent, infinitely foreign ... (TI, 194)
Alterity means that the Other is not equivalent to the same but is not in complete
opposition either.
As mentioned above, Benso acknowledges that Levinas draws upon Descartes'
Third Meditation for historical philosophical precedence (however rudimentary) for the
existence of an Other. According to Davis, Descartes' Meditations is "a crucial point of
reference for Levinas's thought."11 Beavers concurs with Davis when he writes that "the
single most important characteristic ofLevinas' work is the quest for exteriority, for
otherness ... [and] this quest is first articulated by Descartes.,,82 In the Meditations,
Descartes found that he had "the idea that gives me my understanding of a supreme God,
eternal, infinite" (pWD IT, 28). Descartes could not himself be the source of such an idea
since it contains more objective reality than Descartes' formal reality. The source of such
an idea could only be an infinite being (God) - an example of an Other which cannot be
converted into the same. Levinas writes that "Descartes ... discovers a relation with a
total alterity irreducible to interiority" (TI, 211)~ interiority being synonymous with the
same.
Moreover, the idea of an infinite being that a finite being has is necessarily limited
and incomplete~ in the words ofLevinas it is always "overflowing its idea" (TI, 47).
According to Levinas, "the Other at each moment destroys and overflows the plastic
81 Op. Cit., p. 39.
82 Anthony F. Beavers, Levinas beyond the Horizon ofCartesianism: An In.quiry
into the Metaphysics ofMorals (New York: Peter Lang Publishing, 1995), p. 1.
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image it leaves me, the idea existing to my own measure and to the measure of its ideatum
- the adequate idea" (n 51). TlUs indicates that precedence must be granted to the
infinite as source of the finite and not the other way around. The idea of an infinite being
is not simply the inversion of finitude. As Descartes puts it:
I must not think that, just as my conceptions of rest and darkness are
arrived at by negating movement and light, so my perception of the infinite
is arrived at not by means of a true idea but merely by negating the finite.
On the contrary, I clearly understand that there is more reality in an infinite
substance than in a finite one, and hence that my perception of the infinite,
that is God, is in some way prior to my perception ofthe finite, that is
myself (pWD II, 31).
This precedence, which accounts for the priority of ethics over ontology, is the result "not
[of] the insufficiency of the I ... but the Infinity of the Other" (TI, 80).
Just as Descartes discovered his origin as a finite being in an infinite being, the
existence of an Other is the foundation ofsubjectivity for Levinas. As Beavers notes, for
"both Descartes and Levinas, the idea of the infinite transcends the isolation of the ego
cogito, for it always entails that the self is not alone.,,83 The foundation of the subject is
based upon the existence of the Other. Just as the "Cartesian subject seizes itself as
subject by reference to the non-self,,,84 the Levinasian subject establishes subjectivity by
the existence of the Other. As Beavers puts it, "subjectivity is born by being exposed to
83 Beavers, p. 14.
84 Davis, p. 39.
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the other."·s Thus, ''Levinas transforms Descartes's infinite God into his Other...•6 As
Levinas writes, the "Cartesian notion ofthe idea of the Infinite designates a relation with a
being that maintains its total exteriority with respect to him who thinks it" (TI, 50) just as
the Other cannot be reduced to the same. Subjectivity owes its existence to alterity since
"Alterity constitutes the grounds which make separation possible; the self exists because
the Other is irreconcilable with it.,,·7 Though subjectivity is detennined by the Other, it is
not determined in opposition to the Other. Opposition amounts to a reduction of the
Other to the same; "If the same would establish its identity by simple opposition to the
other, it would already be a part of a totality encompassing the same and the other" (TI,
38). As suggested both by Derrida and Davis, opposition amounts to two sides of the
same COin.
Having established that subjectivity is determined by the existence of the absolutely
Other (alterity), the presence of the Other before the same is in need ofexplication. In one
of the definitions of ethics above, Levinas refers to the presence of the Other before the
same as an 'exposure'; in many other places he refers to it as an 'encounter'. The reason
for this is pointed out by Davis who warns that "to describe the relationship with the Other
as a relationship implies a totalizing perspective from which both self and Other are seen
8S Beavers, p. 70.
86 Davis, p. 40.
•7Davis, p. 44.
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to share a common ground."" The terms 'exposure' and 'encounter' are less likely to be
associated with a reduction of the Other to the same than is the term 'relationship'. Davis
points to Levinas' paradoxical characterization ofthis relationship as "a relation without
relation" (TI, 80). So long as one keeps in mind the criteria of alterity, one need not
resort to such an enigmatic expression. Any relationship which does not dissolve the
Other into the same is an adequate example of such a relationship. As Levinas puts it, the
"relationship between me and the Other does not have the structure fonnallogic finds in
all relations. The tenns remain absolute despite the relation in which they find themselves"
(TI, 180).
Levinas proposes several relationships capable of preserving alterity, maintaining
the difference between the same and the Other. This separation can be upheld in the
relationships of desire, the face-to-face, and language. Traditionally, desire is associated
with need. Need, however, implies lack. Thus, the satisfaction of a desire based on need
amounts to making the Other the same - what is desired (other) is the very same as what
one lacks / needs (same). Completion or satisfaction of the same is the goal of a desire
based upon need; thus, the other which is desired is not Other. The desire that Levinas
has in mind is the "desire for the absolutely other" (TI, 34). Such a desire "does not rest
on any prior kinship" (TI, 34) between the same and that which is desired as is the case
with desire based on need. Rather, it "has another intention; it desires beyond everything
that can simply complete it" (TI, 34). It is because of the structure ofdesire - the same
desiring something other than itself, the Other - that the relationship fonned by it does
88 Gp. cit., p. 45.
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not eliminate alterity. As Levinas writes, such "8 relationship ... is not the disappearance
of distance, not a bringing together ... [it is] 8 relationship whose positivity comes from
remoteness, from separation" (TI, 34). Referring back to Descartes, Levinas writes that
the "infinite in the finite, the more in the less, which is accomplished by the idea of Infinity,
is produced as Desire - not a Desire that the possession of the Desirable slakes, but the
Desire for the Infinite which the Desirable arouses rather than satisfies" (TI, 50).
Like desire, the face-to-face relationship preserves the alterity of the Other and
involves infinity. The face is not a concrete object. It is, rather, a mode of being - an
existentiale, to use a Heideggerian term. The face is the "way in which the other presents
himself, exceeding the idea ofthe other in me" (TI, 50). The fact that "the idea of infinity
. . . [is] revealed in the face" (TI, 151) of the Other accounts for the exceeding ofthe idea
of the other in me. Radical separation (alterity), not prone to the reduction to the same, is
accomplished through the relationship of the finite (same) and the infinite (Other).
According to Levinas, "the face ... does not only require a separated being ... the face is
necessary for separation" (TI, 151). For Levinas, The "conjuncture of the same and the
other, in which even their verbal proximity is maintained, is the direct andfullface
welcome ofthe other by me" (TI, 80). The welcoming of the Other in the face to face
relationship preserves alterity; the "face to face both announces a society, and permits the
maintaining of a separated r' (TI, 68). Levinas characterizes the face to face as "an
ultimate situation" (TI, 81) and "a final and irreducible relation" (TI, 291).
As was the case with both the face to face and desire, language is also a





opening pages of Totality and Infinity, Levinas contends that the "effort of this book is
directed toward apperceiving in discourse a non-allergic relation with alterity>' (TI, 47).
Language is capable of preserving the difference between the same and the Other~
"Absolute difference, inconceivable in terms of formal logic, is established only by
language ... discourse relates with what remains essentially transcendent [the Other]. ...
Language is the relation between separated terms" (TI, 195). But this relation does not
dissolve difference. As Levinas puts it, the "relationship between me and the Other does
not have the structure formal logic finds in all relations. The tenns remain absolute
despite the relation in which they find themselves. The relation with the Other is the only
relation where such an overturning of formal logic can occur" (TI, 180-181). Moreover,
language involves an element of infinity because of its relation with the Other. According
to Levinas, to "approach the Other in conversation is to welcome his expression, in which
at each instant he overflows the idea a thought would carry away from it. It is therefore to
receive from the Other beyond the capacity ofthe I, which means exactly: to have the idea
of infinity" (TI, 51).
Ethics is the result of (or, more precisely, equivalent to) these relationships. The
first definition of ethics which began this chapter - that ethics is the exposure of one
subjectivity to the Other - has been expanded upon through consideration of alterity and
the relationships between the same and the Other. This chapter also began with a more
detailed definition ofethics - one which Davis considered an embryonic encapsulation of
the entirety of Levinas' philosophy. That definition points to the ethical element inherent
in all three of the relationships between the same and the Other. The disparity between the
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same and the Other - the fact that the former is limited I finite and the latter is
transcendent / infinite - allows for the ethical characterization of the Other as occupying
a position of 'height". It is because of the difference between the same and the Other
which allows the Other to occupy a position ofheight - not the very fact that the other
occupies a position of height - that makes "intersubjective space . . . not symmetrical"
(TO, 84-85). It is because of separation that anything like an ethical 'calling into question'
of the same by the Other can occur.
The ethical aspect of such a 'calling into question' is due to alterity itself, not
simply because it originates from a height. The Other is what I am not and it is precisely
this difference that calls me into question. It is for this reason that the "transcendence of
the Other, which is his eminence, his height, his lordship, in its concrete meaning includes
his destitution, his exile, and his rights as a stranger" (TI, 76-77). It is the "strangeness of
the Other ... [which constitutes] his very freedom! Free beings alone can be strangers to
one another. Their freedom which is 'common' to them is precisely what separates them"
(TI,73-74). It is this freedom and the resistance to the assimilating efforts of the same
which marks the alterity ofthe Other. To be free is "to maintain oneself against the other,
despite every relation with the other to ensure the autarchy of an I" (TI, 45). It is when
the same encounters the Other - an entity incapable ofbeing assimilated - that it begins
to questions its free reign. According to Davis, the "Other puts me into question by
revealing to me that my powers and freedom are limited.... the encounter with the Other
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shows such freedom to be egoistical, arbitrary, and unjustified."19 The questioning
encounter also distinguishes the Other from that other which "does not fundamentally
challenge its [the same's] supremacy.,,90 As will be shown in the chapter below, the Other
(person) is distinguished from other (thing) based upon the ethical criterion of this
chal1enge.
The counterpart to the calling into question of the same by the Other (ethics) is the
(ethical) response. Although the term 'responsibility' - which is usually accompanied by
the reciprocal term 'obligation' - conjures up ideas ofethics in the normative sense, this
is not Levinas' aim. In Ethics and Infinity, Philippe Nemo asked Levinas whether
"starting from this ethical experience [of the 1 and Other] ... you construct an 'ethics' ...
made up of rules" (El, 90). To this, Levinas replied that his "task does not consist in
constructing ethics; I only try to find its meaning.... One can without a doubt construct
an ethics in function ofwhat 1 have ... said, but this is not my own theme" (EI, 90). As
the section of this thesis above makes clear, the meaning of ethics lies in alterity. Davis
reminds the reader ofLevinas that in "keeping with his phenomenological background he
is descriptive rather than prescriptive, attempting to depict fundamental realities,,91 rather
than constructing normative systems. This (Levinasian) concept ofethics is in keeping
with Benso's concern that an 'ethics of things' will be necessarily 'non-traditional' I.e.
non-normative.
89 Op. cit., p. 49.
90 Op. cit., p. 43.
91 Op. cit., p. 49.
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Just as subjectivity is made possible by the existence of the Other, true freedom -
as opposed to egoistical freedom - is conferred upon the same by the Other through the
response. As Davis summarizes it:
Without the Other, freedom is without purpose or foundation. In the face
to face, the Other gives my freedom meaning because I am confronted with
real choices between responsibility and obligation towards the Other, or
hatred and violent repudiation. The Other invests me with genuine
freedom, and will be the beneficiary or victim of how I decide to exercise
it. 92
In an egology - which is what Levinas contends Heidegger's ontology amounts to -
freedom is the same making choices in relation to itself Only when an Other occurs can
there be true freedom in the Levinasian sense. The response of the Other to the same is -
as the relationship of language implies - indeterminate. One cannot control or even
predict what an Other might say or do. As Edith Wyschogrod states, the "other is
opposed to us not through the force which he uses to resist us but through the absolute
unpredictability of his responses.,,93 Levinas states it best: The Other "can oppose to me a
struggle, that is, oppose to the force that strikes him ... the very unjoreseeableness ofhis
reaction" (T!, 199).
Levinas makes clear the implications of the freedom inherent in the resistance of
the Other to the same. The opposition offered by the Other can "not [be] a greater force .
. . not some superlative of power" (Tr, 199). If that were the case, then the same and the
Other would be bound in a reciprocal relationship offorce and counter-force whereby
92 Ibid.
93 Edith Wyschogrod, Emmanuel Levinas: The Problem ofEthical Metaphysics
(The Hague, Netherlands: Martinus Nijhoff, 1974), p. 86.
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alterity would be annulled~ the reaction (resistance) of the Other would be "presenting
itselfas though it were part ofa whole" (TI, 199) which included the action (force) of the
same. Davis summarizes this in the following way:
The resistance offered by the Other should not be understood as a force
which is superior, or even comparable, to my own. The Other is not
stronger than me in any ordinary sense: to speak in such tenns implies a
commensurability between selfand Other which would be contrary to the
essence ofalterity. No comparison can be made between the force with
which I attack the Other and the resistance it offers.94
Here, Levinas employs an inversion - Benso attempted a similar move above when she
unsuccessfully tried to equate height and vertical difference (distance) - such that the
'power' of the resistance of the Other to the same is "impotency" (TI, 198). As Davis
puts it, "ethical resistance is not measurable in terms of force. In it lies both the strength
and the weakness of the Other. ,,95 According to Levinas, "Infinity presents itselfas a face
in the ethical resistance that paralyses my powers . . . from the depths of defenceless[ness]
... [and] destitution" (TI, 199-200). The 'power' of the Other is not some force of
opposition; rather, it is "precisely the infinity of his transcendence" (TI, 199). It is in this
sense that the resistance ofthe Other to assimilation by the same is related to freedom and
alterity.
Just as both the 'calling into question of the same' and the ethical resistance evince
an asymmetrical relationship between the same and the Other, there is an asymmetry
involved in the response as well. If the response is taken in the normative sense as a
94 Davis, p. 51.
95 Ibid.
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responsibility, then it is borne entirely by the same. That is, the response on the part ofthe
same cannot be motivated by any expected reciprocity on the part of the Other. The
Other does not share a common responsibility with the same. This "decoupling of
responsibility from reciprocity"96 is aligned with the asymmetrical ethical relationship;
"[t]his asymmetry is consistent with Levinas's conception of the Other: to insist on
symmetry or reciprocity would be to imply that I was empowered to speak. for the Other,
that the Other belongs to the same species or genus as mysel[,,97 Moreover, Davis
identifies the correlation between Levinas' relationship between the same and the Other
and the non-nonnative aspect ofhis ethics; the asymmetrical aspect of the ethical
relationship prevents codification into a universally applicable ethical system.
Because of the separation inherent in the relationship between the same and the
Other, the ethical calling into question is nonviolent (as was the resistance of the Other to
the same). As Levinas puts it, the "presentation [of the Other to the same in the face to
face relationship] is preeminently nonviolence, for instead ofoffending my freedom it calls
it to responsibility and founds it. As nonviolence it nonethel.ess maintains the plurality of
the same and the other" (TI, 203). The response, however, because it occurs out of
freedom may be non-violent or violent. As Davis points out, "the fact that the encounter
with the Other is ethical does not mean that I will respond to it in an ethical way.... I am
96 Ibid.
97 Op. cit., pp. 52-53.
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just as likely to respond to the non-violence of the Other With violence as with respect."91
Because the relationship with the Other preserves alterity, the response is made in
freedom. As Levinas puts it, the "order of responsibility ... is also the order where
freedom is ineluctably invoked" (TI, 200).
What does appear to be ethical in the normative sense - at least on the surface -
is the command, issuing from the Other, that "you shall not commit murder" (TI. 199).
But the 'shall' is not to be taken in a nonnative sense; it is descriptive. The attempted
reduction of the Other by the same amounts to a negation (of the Other) through the
affirmation (of the same); such a reduction shows that the same has this ability and
exercises it. Murder, on the other hand, is "the total negation of a being" (TI, 199).
Unlike reduction, murder "is not to dominate [affinnation ofthe same] but to annihilate
[negation ofthe Other]" (TI, 198). Because ofalterity, the "Other is the sole being I can
wish to kill" (TI, 198). But because the Other is infinitely Other (alterity), the same shall
not commit murder; the Other escapes all attempts by the same to negate it. As Levinas
puts it, "I can wish to kill only an existent absolutely independent, which exceeds my
powers infinitely" (TI, 198). Davis summarizes this in the following way:
Levinas does not denounce violence as wrong; rather he attempts to show
that it always fails, that it can never succeed in its true aim. When I kill, 1
am trying to kill the Other, that which is utterly beyond my powers; I may
succeed in killing the other, or even innumerable others, but the Other
survives.... In distinguishing between the Other (the true object of hatred
which 1cannot kill) and others (whom I can kill, all too easily), Levinas is
98 Op. cit., p. 49.
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attempting to demonstrate the futility and uLtimate failure ofviolence,
which never attains its real targets.99
Because the Other is Infinite, it cannot be killed; ''Neither the destruction ofthings, nor the
hunt, nor the extermination of living beings aims at the face, which is not of the world"
(TI, 198).
In his book, Davis outlined three "fundamental problems"1oo faced by Levinas'
conception of the same and the Other. First, "a description and defense ofsubjectivity"lol
is needed. For Levinas, subjectivity is allowed only on the basis of alterity. Second, "an
account ofalterity which does not reduce the other to the Same"102 is necessary. Through
the adoption and adaptation ofDescartes' conception of the infinite, Levinas provides just
such an account. As Levinas writes, his "analyses are guided by a fonnal structure: the
idea ofInfinity in us. To have the idea of Infinity it is necessary to exist as separated" (TI,
79). Finally, Levinas "needs some means of accounting for the relation between the Same
and the Other that does not effectively abolish either."103 With the three relationships
outlined above - desire, the face to face, and language - Levinas is able to bind the
finite (same) with the Other (infinite) while maintaining their alterity. For Levinas, the
Other is not just different / separate from the same; it is infinitely different / separate and
99 Davis, p. 51.






this amounts to its alterity. The existence of the Othe9r (which is transcendent I infinite)
founds subjectivity and the relationships between the same and the Other - desire, the
face to face, and language - do not abolish alterity.
Heidegger's Lack ofEthics
Benso's argument relies upon an understanding of ethics akin to that ofLevinas:
ethics amounts to an encounter ofotherness - restricted by Levinas to the otherness of
the Other (person) but presumably expanded by Benso to include the otherness of things.
As Langan suggests, a "reader can almost exhaust Heidegger's sustained analyses of the
experience and reality of persons other than myself by reading the paragraph on Mitsein in
Sein und Zeit. ,,104 It is there, if anywhere, that one might find a Heideggerian notion
similar to that proposed by Levinas and accepted by Benso. The sections onMitsein
occur in the fourth division ofBeing and Time entitled "Being-in-the-world as Being-With
and Being-One's-Self. The 'They'" (BT, 113:149). With such a title as this, one expects
Heidegger to be able to answer not only to the question "ofwho Dasein is" (BT,
114: 150) but also to the question of who the Other is.
The (who' question arises out of the distinction drawn in the preparatory analysis
between "Existentialia and categories [which] are the two basic possibilities for characters
ofBeing. The entities which correspond to them require different kinds of primary
lO4Thomas Langan, The Meaning ofHeidegger: A Critical Study of an
Existentialist Phenomenology (New York: Columbia University Press, 1959), p. 230.
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interrogation respectively: any entity is either a 'who' (existence) or a 'what' (presence-at-
hand in the broadest sense)" (BT, 45:71). Moreover, it is the concept of 'substantiality'
that provides "the ontological clue for determining which entity is to provide the answer to
the question of 'who'" (BT, 114: 150). According to Heidegger, "man's 'substance' is not
spirit as a synthesis of soul and body~ it is rather existence" (BT, 117: 153) whereas
substantiality is usually associated with things. In this section, Heidegger is concerned
with the 'who' questions rather than the 'what' questions whereas in the preceding section
the opposite was the case.
Heidegger begins his 'who' interrogation with that aspect ofDasein's Being which
is 'proximally and for the most part' given - Dasein in its 'everydayness'. In the first
place and instant, "Dasein is fascinated with its world. Dasein is thus absorbed in the
world" (BT, 113: 149). This 'fascination and absorption' is a type ofBeing that Dasein
has - Dasein is most often found to be in its 'everydayness'. Given its close association
with the world and entities within it, "Dasein itself- and this means also its Being-in-the-
world - gets its ontological understanding of itself in the first instance from those entities
which it itself is not but which it encounters 'within' its world, and from the Being which
they possess" (BT, 58:85). Given that Dasein is Being-in-the-world and thrown into the
world, it is understandable that it attempts to understand itself in tenns ofthat world. But
this amounts to a 'category confusion' of sorts - Dasein gets conceived as a thing-like
entity rather than an existential way ofbeing. Heidegger reiterates the fact that although
"Dasein is tacitly conceived in advance as something present-at-hand ... presence-at-hand
39
is the kind ofBeing which belongs to entities whose character is not that ofDasein" (BT,
115: 150). In its 'everydayness', Dasein is often confused - even about itself.
Because Dasein in its everyday Being is 'fascinated and absorbed' in the world, its
first encounter with Others is likewise determined by the world. As the world is a
referential totality, entities encountered within-the-world are bound together in a network
of interconnecting relations. Dasein primarily encounters equipment within-the-world;
that is, things that have an 'in-order-to' structure and a ready-to-hand type ofBeing. The
work produced also has the type ofBeing that belongs to equipment (ready-to-hand) and
is characterized by its 'towards-which' structure. Within this referential totality is also
something with a 'whereof structure - the material out of which things are made and
upon which the work produced is dependent. All ofthese things have a Being other than
that ofDasein - they are ready-to-hand.
But also in the world, Dasein encounters entities with a Being the same as Dasein.
As Heidegger points out, "along with the work, we encounter not only entities ready-to-
hand but also entities with Dasein's kind ofBeing - entities for which, in their concern,
the product becomes ready-to-hand" (BT, 71: 100). We encounter these entities in the
same world as we encountered equipment - the "public world" (BT, 71: 100). In the
'public world' the Other is either a worker / producer like me (one who handles things, to
whom things are also ready-to-hand) or is the consumer defined in contradistinction to my
producer / worker status. In this instance, the encounter with the Other is always
mediated by work or objects. This means that "Others are encountered environmentally'
(BT, 119:155) - out of the referential totality of the world and, in particular, the work-
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world. When everyday Dasein 'goes about its business' so to speak, it encounters objects
which have a reference / assignment to others:
When, for example, we walk along the edge ofa field but 'outside it', the
field shows itself as belonging to such-and-such a person, and decently kept
up by him~ the book we have used was bought at So-and-so's shop and
given by such-and-such a person, and so forth. The boat anchored at the
shore is assigned in its Being-in-itselfto an acquaintance who undertakes
voyages with it (BT, 118: 153-4).
Others are encountered in the work-world environmentally through references and
assignments associated with things which are ready-to-hand.
When a Dasein comports itself towards things ready-to-hand within the world, it is
operating out of the mode of' concern' . On the other hand, when Dasein comports itself
towards entities which have the Being ofDasein rather than the kind ofBeing which
belongs to entities within-the-world, then it is operating out of' solicitude'. Thus, the so-
called 'object' ofcomportment determines whether Dasein is acting out of concern or
solicitude. If the 'object' is an entity with the kind of Being of ready-to-hand, then Dasein
acts out of concern; if the 'object' is an entity with the kind ofBeing ofDasein, then
Dasein acts out of solicitude. Heidegger demonstrates the distinction between concern
and solicitude with the example of someone 'caring' for another or engaged in 'welfare
work'. While the agent may be concemedwith objects as means, the person for whom
these objects are intended can only be an 'object' of solicitude.
The way in which a Dasein may comport itself towards others Daseins in solicitude
falls into one of three possibilities: "Being for, against, or without one another, passing
one another by, not 'mattering' to one another" (BT, 121: 158). This last way - the
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deficient or indifferent mode of solicitude - is the mode in which Dasein is most often
found. Everyday Dasein. comports itself towards Others, for the most part, in an
indifferent manner. Although the indifferent and deficient "modes ofBeing show again the
characteristics of inconspicuousness and obviousness which belong just as much to the
everyday Dasein-with of Others within-the-world as to the readiness-to-hand of the
equipment with which one is daily concerned" (BT, 121: 158) one should not confuse the
two. Heidegger points out that "Indifferent modes ofBeing-with-one-another may easily
mislead ontological Interpretation into interpreting this kind ofBeing, in the first instance,
as the mere Being-present-at-hand of several subjects" (BT, 121: 158) that is, as ontical.
Indifference is a way ofBeing, and as such is ontological.
The distinction between the ontical and the ontological is also used to differentiate
the positive modes of solicitude~ in its "positive modes, solicitude has two extreme
possibilities" (BT, 122:158). In solicitude, one Dasein can either leap in for another or
leap ahead of another. Dasein "maintains itself between the two extremes of positive
solicitude - that which leaps in and dominates, and that which leaps forth and liberates"
(BT, 122: 159). The first type of solicitude "pertains for the most part to our concern with
the ready-to-hand" (BT, 122: 158) and is thus, ontical in nature. In this form, one Dasein
leaps in for another in order to 'take care of the matter' for them. This leaping-in
displaces the other Dasein and removes the possibility of 'care' from it (or for it). The
primary 'concern' here is with the 'matter at hand' rather than the other Dasein being
displaced or the Being ofthe other Dasein which is displaced. After one Dasein has leapt
in and 'taken care of the matter' for the other Dasein, the latter can either "take it over as
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something finished and at his disposal, or disburden himselfofit completely' (BT,
122: 158). For this reason, this extreme form ofsolicitude can be considered domination
or dependence. The other extreme form of solicitude - leaping ahead - relates to the
ontological structure ofDasein; "This kind of solicitude pertains essentially to authentic
care - that is, to the existence of the Other, not to a 'what' with which he is concerned"
(BT, 122: 159). That this form of solicitude is ontological rather than ontical is made clear
by the fact that it deals with the "existentiell potentiality-for-Being" (BT, 122: 159) which
"proves to be a state ofDasein's Being" (BT, 122: 159).
The examples Heidegger uses for both forms of positive solicitude are drawn from
social existence. There is a difference between a situation in which "one's doing the same
thing as someone else ... [because they have been] hired for the same affair" (BT,
122: 159) and when each person "devote[s] themselves to the same affair in common ...
thus becom[ing] authentically bound together" (BT, 122: 159). At first glance, the only
substantial difference appears to be the origin of the commitment·- the author of the
goal, whether another person (the boss who does the hiring) or the individual himlherself.
However, Heidegger draws an ontological distinction between these two ways of
comportment. The former type of devotion is "bound up with ... Being towards the
world" (BT, 122: 159) while the latter is bound up with "authentic Being towards itself'
(BT, 122:159). The determining factor in these ways ofBeing is the "matter of common
concern" (BT, 122:159) for each Dasein and "the manner in which their Dasein, each in its
own way, has been taken hold of' (BT, 122: 159), respectively. In the first example, the
persons are bound together in their concern with the 'work' to be done or the money they
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will be paid - in other words, the material / ontic aspect. In the second exampJe, people
are bound together by the type ofBeing which they possess in common. Association in
this group is dependent upon the extent to which one's own. Being has been revealed - it
is an a-social matter. What makes an association or group authentic is the way ofBeing
which each member possesses. Thus, the authenticity ofgroup associations rests with
each individual Dasein. In contrast, when people are merely bound together by a common
task they operate in "modes of distance and reserve ... [characterized by] mistrust" (BT,
122:159).
In its everyday Being-with-one-another, Dasein often comports itself towards
others in the mode of distantiality. The concept of'distantiality' may be a mode ofBeing
capable of distinguishing one Dasein from another. This seems like a viable candidate for
the factor which would differentiate one Dasein from another for two reason: (i) it
includes 'difference' for in 'distantiality' "there is a constant care as to the way one differs
from them" (BT, 126: 163); (ii) it is an existential / ontological component ofDasein.
Elliston is quick to point to 'distantiatity' as a distinguishing factor. But he also
recognizes that "Heidegger's notion of distantiality does not point to differences between
persons but between their worlds - what they possess, have a right to or deserve."lo,
Although 'right' and' deserve' are normative concepts rather than ontological ones,
'possess' is recognized as an ontological word. In fact, the way in which Heidegger
actually states it is: "one's concern [is] with what one has taken hold of' (BT, 126: 163).
lOS Frederick Elliston, ed. Heidegger's Existential Analytic. (New York: Mouton
Publishers, 1978), p. 73.
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The term 'taken hold of should not be restricted to the world for Dasein also 'takes hold'
of its Self / Being. Elliston is aware ofthe unity ofDasein and its world for he recognizes
that "to destroy all material difference would be to destroy part of each person's sense of
self"106 Yet the fact remains that 'distantiality', although a mode ofBeing, is concerned
with ontical distinctions rather than ontological ones. In the mode ofeverydayness,
Dasein uses material differences in order to differentiate Daseins it encounters. As Elliston
points out, 'distantiality' and the material difference it entails is used by Dasein in its
everydayness "as the basis for interpreting social relations"lo7 between Daseins.
Although another Dasein is encountered in the world along with objects and one
Dasein comports itself towards another primarily in 'distantiality' (by taking into account
material differences), this does not mean that the Being ofOthers is the same as the Being
of things. Heidegger makes clear that "the kind ofBeing which belongs to the Dasein of
Others, as we encounter it within-the-world, differs from readiness-to-hand and presence-
at-hand" (BT, 118:154). Although others are encountered within a referential totality that
is the world of equipment, they are still encountered as beings whose existence is
existentiality rather than substantiality. As Heidegger points out, "even if Others become
themes for study ... they are not encountered as person-Things present-at-hand: we meet
them 'at work', that is, primarily in their Being-in-the-world" (BT, 120:156). The




time . . . we just work with and deal with others skillfully without having any beliefs about
them or their beliefs at aU."108
The latter part oftbis quotation is an important element for distinguishing
Beidegger's conception of ,intersubjectivity' - Being-with - from that ofBussed's. It
is not Being-present-at-hand within a world or having beliefs in common with others that
allows one Dasein to encounter another; "[w]hen Others are encountered, it is not the case
that one's own subject is proximally present-at-hand and that the rest of the subjects,
which are likewise occurents, get discriminated beforehand and then apprehended" (BT,
118-119: 155). It is Dasein's own being - as Being-with - which makes anything like
'intersubjectivity' possible. Neither oneself or Others should be "encountered as person-
Things present-at-hand ... [but] primarily in their Being-in-the-world" (BT, 120:156).
For Heidegger, Being-in-the-world and Being-with are the ontological ways of
being which allow for 'intersubjectivity'. As Beidegger puts it:
By 'Others' we do not mean everyone else but me - those over against
whom the 'I' stands out. They are rather those from whom, for the most
part, one does not distinguish oneself- those among whom one is too.
This Being-there-too with them does not have the ontological character of
Being-present-at-hand-along-'with' them within a world. This 'with' is
something of the character ofDasein; the 'too' means a sameness ofBeing
as circumspectively concernful Being-in-the-world. 'With' and 'too' are to
be understood existentially, not categorically. By reason of this with-like
Being-in-the-world, the world is always the one that I share with others.
The world ofDasein is a with-world. Being-in is Being-with Others. Their
Being-in-themselves within-the-world is Dasein-with (BT, 118: 154-155).
lOll Hubert L. Dreyfus, Being-in-the-World: A Commentary on Heidegger's Being
and Time, Division I (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1991), p. 148.
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Both '1' and 'Others' are united through the ontological structure that we share; we have
a 'sameness ofBeing' since we are both Daseins. For Heidegger, "Dasein in itselfis
essentially Being-with" (BT, 120: 156).
That Being-with is an existential - not an ontical - condition ofDasein is borne
out by the fact that a Dasein still is Being-with "even when factically no Other is present-
at-hand or perceived" (BT, 120: 156). IfBeing-with were an ontical / factical matter, then
Dasein could not possibly be Being-with when no Other is present. For Heidegger, the
ontical is made possible by the ontological - not the other way around. Thus, "Even
Dasein's Being-alone is Being-with in the world.... Being-alone is a deficient mode of
Being-with; its very possibility is the proof ofthis" (BT, 120:156-157). Conversely,
Being-alone is not immediately terminated when one is no longer alone; "Being-alone is
not obviated by the occurrence of a second example of a human being 'beside' me, or by
ten such examples. Even if these and more are present-at-hand, Dasein can still be alone"
ontologically (BT, 120: 157). Thus, Heidegger concludes that "Being-with and the
facticity ofBeing with one another are not based on the occurrence together of several
'subjects'" (BT, 121: 157).
Being-with is an essential aspect ofDasein's being - one which, according to
Dreyfus, is "more basic than relating to particular others."I09 Because Dasein's being is
Being-in-the-world, Being will always precede any relationship between one Dasein and
another. When a Dasein is operating environmentally or equipmentally it is "always
109 Op. cit., p. 149.
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already involved in a shared world"llo whether there is another Dasein there or not. The
world of any particular Dasein is a shared world and due to this fact, when a Dasein is
there, it is there with others (whether there is another Dasein or not). According to
Dreyfus, "[e]ven when I am not encountering others nor using equipment, others are there
for me. I have a readiness for dealing with them along with my readiness for dealing with
equipment. ,,111
With a distinction in Being - between a thing which has presence-at-hand as its
type ofBeing and a Dasein which has Being-in as its type ofBeing - Heidegger is
attempting to avoid many ontological and epistemological problems which naturally result
from the subject-object distinction. He resists attempts to reduce his ontology back to one
involving subjects and objects. Even his language cannot be translated into one based on
such distinctions; "subject and Object do not coincide with Dasein and the world" (BT,
60:87). The reason he resists such attempts is because "the problem [then] arises of how
this knowing subject comes out of its inner 'sphere' into one which is 'other and external'"
(BT, 60:87). The subject-object distinction is, for Heidegger, "an inappropriate
interpretation ... indeed a baleful one" (BT, 59:86). Ifone relied upon presence-at-hand
as the distinguishing factor for Dasein - one which was capable of"marking out and
isolating the 'I' ... one must then seek some way of getting over to the Others from this




One must be careful to keep this ontical-ontological distinction in mind when
examfning Heidegger's consideration of Others. Heidegger subtly reminds the reader of
this point in the following passage:
In clarifying Being-in-the-world we have shown that a bare subject without
a world never 'is' proximally, nor is it ever given. And so in the end an
isolated 'I' without Others is just as far from being proximally given. If,
however, 'the Others' already are there with us in Being-in-the-world, and
if this is ascertained phenomenally, even this should not mislead us into
supposing that the ontological structure ofwhat is thus 'given' is obvious,
requiring no investigation. Our task is ... to interpret it [Dasein] in a way
which is ontologically appropriate (BT, 116:152).
Because of its inability to 'get Dasein as a whole into view', the ontical analysi~ - one to
which Heidegger refers not only by the use of such terms as 'proximally' and 'given' but
also by the use ofquotation marks around the word 'is' in order to emphasize its ontical
rather than ontological usage - is one which is ontologicaJly inappropriate. That being
the case, Heidegger must provide an ontological analysis of both Dasein and Others. The
ontological analysis ofDasein, not the ontic, is what is "phenomenally adequate ... [and]
appropriate" (BT, 116:152) for the type ofBeing which is Dasein. Asking the 'who'
question "requires that we formulate the question existentially and ontologically as the
sole appropriate way of access" (BT, 117: 153) to Dasein; moreover it demands that the
answer be an ontological one as well.
By defining Being as Being-in-the-world, Heidegger circumvents the subject-
object distinction - the distinction becomes an ontological matter of different types of
Being. The result ofan ontological understanding ofBeing as Being-in-the-world which
eliminates the subject-object distinction is that there is no longer any "problem of
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knowledge other than that of the phenomenon oflmowing as such ,and the kind ofBeing
which belongs to the knower" (BT, 61 :88). But it is precisely the kind ofBeing which
belongs to Dasein that presents problems for distinguishing 'I' and the Other. By defining
Dasein as Being-with, Heidegger hopes to circumvent the problem ofthe I-Other
distinction.
Again referring to Husserl, Heidegger wants to replace the "phenomenon, which is
none too happily designated as 'empathy' ... [which is supposed] to provide the first
ontological bridge from one's own subject, which is given proximally as alone, to the
other subject, which is proximally quite closed oft" (BT, 124: 162) with his conception of
Being-with. Being-with, which is an essential part ofDasein's Being, eliminates the need
for any sort of an 'ontological bridge'. That is, ifDasein's being already has Being-with-
Others as part of its ontological makeup then there is no need to account for how one
Dasein reaches another. As Heidegger states: "Dasein, as Being-in-the-world, already is
with Others" (BT, 125: 162). Since the other Dasein "has itselfthe same kind ofBeing as
Dasein ... there is thus a relationship of Being from Dasein to Dasein" (BT, 124:162).
Being-with as an ontological definition ofDasein is, however, incapable of
distinguishing one Dasein from another. Both the 'I' and Other are unified by the fact that
they are both Dasein and in the particular type ofBeing that Dasein possesses - Being-in-
the-world and Being-with. Yet Heidegger includes the term 'Dasein-with' which
represents the being of other Daseins themselves - as if they were able to be
distinguished existentially I ontologically from Dasein. Perhaps there is no such thing as
one Dasein or an other Dasein; maybe there is only Dasein.
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It is quite true that Dasein in its everyday dealings with others, has a tendency to
identify itselfwith others. Ifthe 'who' question is asked of a Dasein as Being-in-the-
world / Being-with, the answer would most likely be 'I am'. But Heidegger views this
response as nothing more than "a non-committalfonnal indicator, indicating something
which may perhaps reveal itself as its 'opposite' in some particular phenomenal context of
Being" (BT, 116: 152). But how can the 'I' be 'not-I' without violating the law ofnon-
contradiction? The 'particular phenomenal context' Heidegger has in mind is Being-in-
the-world. As noted above, Dasein has a tendency to be 'fascinated and absorbed' by its
world and takes ontological cues for interpretation from it. In this sense, the 'I' is 'not-I'
because it is the 'they'. When Dasein is "as everyday Being-with-one another ... It itself
is not; its Being has been taken away by the Others. Dasein's everyday possibilities of
Being are for the Others to dispose ofas they please." (BT, 126: 164). The 'they'
"controls every way in which the world and Dasein gets interpreted" (BT, 127: 165) even
by Dasein itself; this common way of understanding the world and Dasein is designated by
the term 'publicness'. These public ways ofBeing are part ofDasein's own Being; "The
'they' is an existentiale; and as a primordialphenomenon, it belongs to Dasein 's positive
constitution" (BT, 129: 167).
Although these ways ofBeing are not authentic - coming from one's own Self-
they are a part ofDasein's Being. Once again, we return to a concept of Selfwith no
apparent foundation because we can find no distinction between oneself and Others. It is
not the separation ofDasein from the 'they' which constitutes Being authentic for this
would amount to Dasein's separation from its own Being; "Authentic Being-one's-Self
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does not rest upon an exceptional condition of the subject) a condition that has been
detached from the 'they'; it is rather an existentiell modification ofthe 'they' - ofthe
'they' as an essential existentiale" (BT, 130: 168). A consequence ofhaving the authentic
as a modification ofthe in-authentic, is that "there is ontologically a gap separating the
selfsameness of the authentically existing Selffrom the identity of that 'I' which maintains
itself through its manifold experiences" (BT, 130:168). The latter does not maintain itself
identically through changes its experiences and must therefore denote the everyday 'I'
which is both 'I' and 'not-1', 'Self and 'Other/they'. The former must denote the
authentic Self that answers the 'who' question. For Heidegger:
the question of the 'who' answers itselfin terms of the '1' itself, the
'subject', the 'Self. The 'who' is what maintains itselfas something
identical throughout changes in its Experiences and ways ofbehaviour, and
which relates itself to this changing multiplicity in so doing.... As
something selfsame in manifold otherness, it has the character of the Self'
(BT, 114:150).
The dual notion ofSelf- both that which changes and is everyday and that which stays
the same and is authentic - still originates in Being. Heidegger tries to clarify this
distinction in the lengthy passage which follows:
The Self of everyday Dasein is the they-self, which we distinguish from the
authentic Self- that is, from the Selfwhich has been taken hold of in its
own way. As they-self, the particular Dasein has been dispersed into the
'they', and must first find itself ... Dasein is for the sake ofthe 'they' in
an everyday manner, and the 'they' itself Articulates the referential context
of significance. . .. Proximally, factical Dasein is in the with-world, which
is discovered in an average way. Proximally, it is not '1', in the sense of
my own Self, that 'am', but rather the Others, whose way is that of the
'they'. In terms of the 'they', and as the 'they', I am 'given' proximally to
'myself. Proximally Dasein is 'they', and for the most part it remains so.
(BT, 129: 167).
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The concept of Selfdoes little to differentiate the everyday from the authentic. The
everyday self is 'taken hold of in its own way' as everyday. Insofar as the 'they' self is
part of the authentic self, it is 'my own Self. Likewise, the 'they' self which is delivered
over to the everyday self is part of its own Self Both the way in which the world and
one's own Being is discovered is according to 'its own way' as everyday. The ontological
gap to which Heidegger referred seems insunnountable, but once accomplished Dasein
may be complete and authentic - discovering the ways ofboth the everyday and the
authentic.
Indeed, there must be an existential way in which I and the Other are differentiated
in Dasein / Being. According to Heidegger, "Dasein's Being is distinctive in that it implies
the possibility and the necessity of the most radical individuation" (BT, 38:62). Even the
earliest definitions ofDasein indicate that this is the case. In the first introduction, Dasein
is defined as that "entity which each ofus is himselfand which includes inquiring as one of
the possibilities of its Being" (BT, 7:27. Emphasis mine.). The opening words of the first
section are: "We are ourselves the entities to be analysed. The Being of any such entity is
in each case mine" (BT, 42:67). Again Heidegger writes that "Dasein has in each case
mineness . .. [and] Dasein is in each case mine" (BT, 42-43:68). The concept of
'mineness' seems to be the differentiating / individuating factor. Moreover, any definition
including the concept of ,mineness' is phenomenally appropriate because such a
"definition indicates an ontologically constitutive state" (BT, 114: 150) ofDasein. Since
'mineness' is an ontological term, it amounts a 'way of Being' for Dasein. For Dasein to
be 'mine' means "to be in one way or another" (BT, 42:68). illtimately then, the
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individual Oasein "has always made some sort of decision as to the way in which it is in
each case mine" (BT, 42:68). To be in one way or another means to have possible ways
ofBeing. To have possibilities implies authenticity. Thus, "because Dasein is in each case
essentially its own possibility, it can, in its very Being, 'choose' itself and win itself~ it can
lose itself and never win itself; or only 'seem' to do so" (BT, 42:68). For Oasein to
choose itself amounts to 'mineness' and authenticity~ for Dasein to lose itself and/or not
choose itself amounts to inauthenticity. Thus, 'mineness' is inextricably bound to
authenticity; to be "authentic . .. [is to be) something of its own" (BT, 43:68). For
Heidegger, "Oasein is an entity which in each case I myself am. Mineness belongs to any
existent Oasein, and belongs to it as the condition which makes authenticity and
inauthenticity possible" (BT, 53:78). This does not mean, however, that inauthenticity is
the same as 'not-mineness'; as a possibility ofDasein, inauthenticity is just as much 'mine'
as authenticity.
That mineness I authenticity is a possibility is indicated by the remainder of the
above quotation:
IfOasein discovers the world in its own way and brings it close, ifit
discloses to itself its own authentic Being, then this discovery of the
'world' and this disclosure ofDasein are always accomplished as a
clearing-away ofconcealments and obscurities, as a breaking up of the
disguises with which Oasein bars its own way (BT, 129: 167).
The 'they' represents an obstruction to the discovery ofthe authentic self- what
Heidegger refers to as 'concealments and obscurities'. In contrast to the 'concealments
and obscurities' represented by the 'they', Heidegger employs the term 'transparency' to
"designate 'knowledge of the Self' (BT, 146: 186) - that is, knowledge which is mine I
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from myself (Dasein) / authentic. Transparency is a matter of"seizing upon the full
disclosedness ofBeing-in-the-world throughout all the constitutive items which are
essential to it" (BT, 146: 187). Knowledge arrived at through everyday relationships with
others may be true in the sense ofhaving in view an aspect ofDasein's being; however, it
does not and cannot be true in the sense ofcomplete - encompassing all aspects of
Dasein's being. Only mineness / authenticity can claim the latter.
The way in which the 'obscurities and concealments' of the 'they' self and its
public understanding is 'cleared away' is through anxiety and death. Anxiety is the
discovery of the world which is revealed to Dasein directly (transparently) and death is the
direct discovery ofDasein as / in its authentic Being. Anxiety individualizes Dasein by
revealing its own Being to it in its entirety. Anxiety operates by bringing "Dasein back
from its falling, and mak[ing] manifest to it that authenticity and inauthenticity are
possibilities ofits Being" (BT, 191 :235). Death is likewise capable ofindividualizing
Dasein:
Death is a possibility-of-Being which Dasein itself has to take over in every
case. With death, Dasein stands before itself in its ownmost potentiality-
for-Being. This is a possibility in which the issue is nothing less than
Dasein's Being-in-the-world. Its death is the possibility of no-longer
being-able-to-be-there. If Dasein stands before itself as this possibility, it
has been fully assigned to its ownmost potentiality-for-Being. When it
stands before itself in this way, all its relations to any other Dasein have
been undone. This ownmost non-relational possibility is at the same time
the uttennost one. As potentiality-for-Being, Dasein cannot outstrip the
possibility ofdeath. Death is the possibility of the absolute impossibility of
Dasein. Thus death reveals itself as that possibility which is one's
ownmost, which is non-relational, and which is not to be outstripped (BT,
250-1:294).
Insofar as it reveals Dasein's Being in its entirety to itself from itself, death is Dasein's
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'ownmost' and individuates it authentically. But both anxiety and death 'leave the other
behind'. They involve no other than the Dasein in question. Authenticity is accomplished
a-socially.
Levinas' Response to Heidegger
In essence, what Benso's claim about the lack ofan ethics (akin to that ofLevinas)
in Heidegger amounts to is the "charge that Being and Time presents an inadequate view
of the social relation"U2 - a view which lacks a concept of the Other qua Other i.e. as
alterity. Manning points out that "[a] first, it may appear as though Heidegger is immune
to this charge, for in Being and Time he posits that a basic state ofDasein is that it already
and always is Being-With-Others (Mitseinandersein)."l13 He points out that:
Levinas refers to the very blatant fact that in Being and Time, sociality is
almost exclusively presented as an aspect ofDasein's fallenness, and
solitude is presented as the way whereby Dasein can achieve authenticity.
For Heidegger, Dasein's inherent aspect ofBeing-With is what gets it in
trouble; Dasein becomes lost in the inauthentic potentialities for itself that
the social collectivity, the they, presents to it. It is only by turning away
from the they and by turning to itself via a process of individuation that
Dasein has any hope of achieving authenticity. 114
Sociality in Heidegger is not only an inauthentic and everyday way ofBeing, but there is
112 Robert John Sheffler Manning, Interpreting Otherwise than Heidegger:
Emmanuel Levinas as First Philosophy (Pittsburgh: Duquesne University Press, 1993), pp.
49-50.
113 0 . 49p. CIt., p. .
114 0 . 50p. CIt., p. .
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no authentic alternative to it - there is only the authentic Selfwhich has individuated
itself and in so doing, isolated itself in Being. In examining its possibilities, Dasein must
first identify and reclaim itself from the 'they' then must choose itself over the 'they'. This
being the case, "in Heidegger the way to authenticity is the way away from sociality,
which is primarily a polluting and distorting influence, and toward solitude and
individualization."llS As Manning puts it, "Levinas ... rejects Heidegger's analysis of
sociality ... [and] interprets sociality explicitly otherwise than Heidegger does - i.e. in
terms ofthe solitude of the self- in favor ofanalyzing the relation between the selfand
the other.,,1l6 What Heidegger lacks in his phenomenology of social existence is the
recognition of any Other qua other. An-other Dasein is still Dasein and shares in the same
Being with Others. Given the individuation of the authentic Self, this amounts to a pre-
existent relationship with the Other. While "Heidegger ... sees the importance of the
social relation to lie in the fact that it helps or hinders Dasein in its solitary task of
actualizing its own possibilities. . . Levinas insists that the importance of the social
relation consists in the more primordial fact that the self encounters and is encountered by
the Other."ll1 It is in the encounter with the Other that Dasein should first come in
contact with what is truly other rather than what is the same. As Manning puts it:
In this primordial relation, the self experiences the other not only as an
other self, but also as a self entirely different from the self. . . The Other
does not merely have other qualities than the self has; the Other is itself the
l1S 0 . 51p. CIt., p. .
116 Ibid.
117 0 . 52p. CIt., p. .
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quality ofotherness. In the social relation the self encounters and is
encountered by the otherness of the Other, the very fact ofalterity itself l18
As mentioned above, Heidegger rejects the notion of empathy and projection (which is
important to the phenomenology ofHusserI) as a way of deriving the other from the self
What Manning refers to when he writes of the experience of 'an other self is not the
projection of the self onto an other; rather, it is the reduction of the other to the same.
That is, an other is the same as one-selfbecause they are both Daseins I in Being. For
Dasein, there is nothing which is other than itself; even death - a candidate for ultimate
Other - is not only the impossibility of all possibilities, but more importantly my
possibilities specifically. Phenomenologically speaking, Being is the 'end-all and be-all'.
Even though he recognizes the Being-with structure ofDasein, Levinas still denies
that Heidegger's conception of it is an adequate basis for sociality. Although the
"relationship with the Other is indeed posed by Heidegger as an ontological structure of
Dasein . .. practically it plays no role in the drama of being or in the existential analytic.
All the analyses ofBeing and Time are worked out either for the sake of the impersonality
of everyday life or for the sake of solitary Dasein" (TO, 40). It is for this reason that
Levinas states that "from the start I repudiate the Heideggerian concept that views
solitude in the midst of a prior relationship with the other.... [for] the conception seems
to me ontologically obscure" (TO, 40). According to Levinas, Heidegger establishes the
prior relationship with the other (Being-with) and solitude (individuation I authenticity) as
correlative tenns - sociality is the absence of individuality, while individuality is the
118 Ibid.
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absence of sociality. This circular definition may not be vicious, but it may be unfounded
- except by Being which is the object of the very inquiry in question. As Levinas puts it,
"[i]dentification is in fact the very positing of an entity in the heart of the anonymous and
all-invading being. One can then not define a subject by identity, since identity covers
over the event of the identification of the subject" (EE, 87). For Levinas, U[t]here is at
least an ambiguity. I find here an invitation to go beyond the definition of solitude by
sociality and of sociality by solitude" (TO, 40). The Other I alterity is the way one 'goes
beyond' these correlative terms. The Other is himlher "wherein this solitude can be
exceeded" (TO, 41).
Levinas 'defines' solitude as a condition which "concerns no one other than the
existent" (TO, 43). Besides the fact that Dasein must individualize itself to arrive at its
authentic Self and such individualization involves withdrawing from the Others, Levinas
points to an interesting source of solitude: the relationship between Being and a given
Dasein, between "existing and existent" (TO, 44). The ontological distinction between
"the beings that are, existents - from their very work of being . . . is posited from the
start ofBeing and Time" (TO, 44). Most definitions of Dasein point to the fact that its
ability to relate itself to its own Being distinguishes Dasein ontologically from things with
the type ofBeing as ready-to-hand. In Heidegger's own words, Dasein is that entity
which "in its very Being, that Being is an issue for it. But in that case, this is a constitutive
state ofDasein's Being, and this implies that Dasein, in its Being, has a relationship
towards that Being - a relationship which itself is one of Being" (BT, 12:32). The so-
called'closed-loop' of an entity ontologically defined in the circular, differentiated and
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individualized by the way in which it relates to Being is equivalent to 'solitude'. Thus,
"solitude lies in the very fact that there are existents" (TO, 43). Solitude is not an ontic
matter; it is not "the factual isolation ofRobinson Crusoe" (TO, 43) separated from others
on a deserted island. It is not an epistemological matter; it is not "the incommunicability
of a content ofconsciousniousness" (TO, 43). It is an ontological matter; "the
indissoluble unity between the existent and its work ofexisting" (TO, 43).
In his consideration ofBeing-in-the-world as basic state ofDasein, Heidegger has
attempted to eliminate the use of such words as 'inside' and 'outside'. He does this by
uniting Dasein and its world in Being-in-the-world as well as Dasein and Other in Being-
with. But ifDasein in its various ways ofBeing always is towards that Being and this
amounts to solitude as Levinas suggests, then such concepts resurface. For Levinas, "[t]o
take up the existing in the existent is to enclose it" (TO, 43) and this means that "[m]y
relationship with existing ... [is] the interior relationship par excellence" (TO, 42). The
interiority of the relationship between a being and Being amounts to solitude and it is
Heidegger's conception of ontology (which incorporates solitude) which amounts to an
'egology'. The ontological distinction is "the fact of being ... [that] is most private" (EI,
57) and creates an 'interior' ego. Heidegger's Dasein is marked by "the self-sufficiency of
the same, it identification in ipseity, its egoism. Philosophy is [therefore] an egology" (TI,
44). Since "[s]olitude thus appears here as the isolation which marks the very event of
being ... [t]he social is beyond ontology" (El, 57-58). Although Heidegger tried to
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'dissolve'1l9 the subject-object, I-other problems with his Being-in-the-world and Being-
with, the ontological distinction and the solitude it represents means that "the duality of
the exterior and the interior thus recurs in Dasein, as in the whole of traditional ontology"
(EE,47).
In addition to the fact that Heidegger does not recognize the alterity of the Other,
Levinas questions the relationship between a Dasein and another - for Heidegger, there
is not / cannot be an unmediated relationship with the Other. Even ifHeidegger' s
conception ofBeing-with were capable ofestablishing an Other, the relationship with such
an Other would still be mediated. For Levinas, the face-to-face relationship with the
Other is a direct, unmediated relationship. All relationships with others in Heidegger,
however, are mediated. In the first instance, Dasein's relationship with others is mediated
by the world / environment / the work-world of equipment. If this is viewed onticaUy,
then the "Others who are thus 'encountered' in a ready-to-hand, environmental context of
equipment, are ... encountered from out of the world, .. a world which is always mine
too in advance" (BT, 118:154). Thus, others are encountered from out ofworld which is
myconcem.
Even if one views the relationship between one Dasein and another ontologically,
rather than ontically, the relationship is still mediated by the Being (Being-in-the-world /
Being-with) that Dasein shares with others. It is the ontological 'Being-with' which forms
the Heideggerian relationship between Dasein and others. Much ofLevinas' work
119 Dreyfus, p. 151. lowe this term to Dreyfus who wrote that "the question of
other minds, rather than remaining a basic philosophical problem, as it is for Descartes,
HusserI, and Sartre, is 'dissolved' by Heidegger."
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(particularly that devoted to alterity) amounts to a "putting into question of this with as
possibility ofescaping solitude" (E1, 58). It is Levinas' relationship between one and the
Other (alterity) rather than Heidegger's relationship among / with Dasein that represents
"a participation in being which makes us escape from solitude" (EI, 58). Thus, according
to Levinas, "it is not the preposition mit [with] that should describe the original
relationship with the other,,120 (TO, 41).
In addition to questioning the ability of the 'with' to capture the relationship with
the Other, Levinas questions the type of relationship it establishes. As noted above and
emphasized by Benso, the relationship with the Other is assymetrical. Yet the relationship
established by Heidegger's use of 'with' amounts to "reciprocally being with one another"
(TO, 40). Reciprocity is not assymetrical. In Heidegger's relationship of the 'with',
"[0 ]ne iffor the other what the other is for oneself, there is no exceptional place" (TO,
83). Reciprocity means interchangeability, not assymetry. Dasein and another Dasein "are
interchangeable because they are reciprocal" (TO, 83). For Levinas, I "and the other do
not constitute a simple correlation, which would be reversible. The reversibility of a
relation ... would couple them the one to the other . .. [and] transcendence would be
reabsorbed into the unity of the system, destroying the radical alterity of the other" (TI,
35-36). The best way to describe Heidegger's sociality, according to Levinas, is by the
120 Although Levinas uses the term 'with' in this denouncement of the
Heideggerian 'with' as a basis for relationship, it must be remembered that Levinas does
not conceive of such a relationship in the terms of formal logic. The preposition does not
combine independent substantives into a relationship. Levinas' relationship preserves
alterity and it is for this reason that it is a relationship 'only by analogy'. For a linguistic
analysis of the term 'relationship' and its ontological implications see EE 21 and TI 180-
181.
term 'communion'. According to Levinas, "[s]ocial life in the world is communication or
communion.... [It is] through participation in something common, in an idea, a common
interest, a work, a meal, in a 'third man' that contact is made. Persons are not simply in
front of one another, they are along with each other around something" (BE, 41).
Heidegger's relationship established by the 'with' is of this structure.
The reason for Levinas' rejection of the Heideggerian preposition 'with' as the
basis for a relationship with the Other is because it reduces the Other to the same, thereby
eliminating its alterity. The reduction of the other to the same, "depriving the known
being of its alterity can be accomplished only if it is aimed at through a third tenn, a
neutral tenn, which itself is not a being" (TI, 42). That is, mediation is part of reduction.
Levinas offers three possible ways in which this reduction can be accomplished. First, the
"third term may appear as a concept of thought" (TI, 42). If that is the case then "the
individual that exists abdicates into the general that is thought" (TI, 42). Next, the "third
term may be called sensation" (TI, 42). If that is the case then the "objective quality and
subjective affection are merged" (TI, 42). These first two ways of reducing the other to
the same relate to things and will be examined in the chapter below. Final1y, and most
importantly, the third term "may appear as Being distinguished from the existent: Being,
which at the same time is not (that is, is not posited as an existent) and ... which is not a
nothing" (TI, 42). This third way of interposing a neutral third term is best understood by
the general term 'ontology'. For Levinas, Heidegger's Being and Time represents "an
ontology: a reduction of the other to the same by interposition of a middle and neutral
term that ensures the comprehension of being" (TI, 43). That term is the impersonal,
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neutral term "Being" or "Dasein" . As Levinas writes, "Miteinandersein, too, remains the
collectivity of the 'with,' and is revealed in its authentic form around the truth. It is a
collectivity around something common. Just as in all philosophies ofcommunion, sociality
in Heidegger is found in the subject alone; and it is in terms of solitude that the analysis of
Dasein in its authentic form is pursued" (TO, 93).
Both Heidegger and Levinas makes use of the terms 'neuter', 'neutral', and
'anonymous'. For Heidegger, there is anonymity in the 'neuter' 'they':
The 'who' is not this one, not that one, not oneself, not some people, and
not the sum ofthem all. The 'who' is the neuter, the 'they' . ... Everyone
is the other, and no one is himself The 'they', which supplies the answer
to the question of the 'who' ofeveryday Dasein, is the 'nobody' to whom
every Dasein has already surrendered itselfin Being-among-one-another"
(BT: 127-128: 164-166).
In the anonymity of the 'they', Dasein 'disburdens' itself and loses its Being. Levinas
contends that a being's relationship with Being has the same effect. Being is the
impersonal, neutral 'third term' into which Dasein loses itself According to Levinas,
"Heideggerian ontology ... subordinates the relationship with the Other to the relation
with Being in general, [and thereby] remains under obedience to the anonymous" (TI, 46).
That the ontological distinction itself amounts to a "forgetting ofBeing" (TI, 46) is the
reason for this. Levinas contends that "the philosophy of the Neuter ... [is] the
Heideggerian Being of the existent. ...[T]he primacy of the Neuter ... [is to] place the
Neuter dimension of Being above the existent" (TI, 298).
CHAPTERnI
TIllNGS
As was stated in the above chapter, Benso's supplementation ofLevinas and
Heidegger rests upon the claim that Levinas has a concept ofethics which Heidegger lacks
but Heidegger has a concept ofthings which Levinas lacks. According to Benso, "there
are things in Heidegger. For him, things are the place where the gathering of the fourfold
- the mortals, the gods, the earth, the sky - comes to pass."121 Benso draws upon
Heidegger's conception of the Fourfold because she perceives there a concept akin to
Levinas' 'alterity'. Although the relation between the so-called 'early' and 'late'
Heidegger is not the focus of this thesis, it becomes germane because ofBenso's use ofit
in relation to things. To be sure, there are many different views on the consistency or
inconsistency between the Heidegger ofBeing and Time and the 'late' Heidegger.
However, Heidegger himself notes in Letter on Humanism that the more 'poetical' notion
of dwelling in the so-called 'late' Heidegger "is the essence of 'being-in-the-world' ... in
Being and Time" (BW, 236). As such, references to both 'early' and 'late' Heidegger
121 Benso, p. 132.
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shall be used. Whether Heidegger has an adequate notion of things will be examined
below. Yet according to Benso, "there are no things for Levinas. "122
Heidegger on Things
In his introduction to Building Dwelling Thinking, Krell states that "Heidegger
sees the thing as the concrescence ofwhat he calls the fourfold (das Geviert) ofearth, sky,
mortals, and divinities" (BW, 321). Yet he adds that "[n]o introductory words of ours can
explain what Heidegger means by the this fourfold.... [It] is strange" (BW, 321).
Although the concept of the fourfold verges on being incomprehensible, some sense can
be made of it. The importance of the fourfold is not so much what Heidegger says it is as
what use he makes of it. The fourfold is a ''primal oneness [of] the four [elements] -
earth and sky, divinities and mortals - [that] belong together" (BW, 327). Heidegger
waxes poetic when he writes that:
Earth is the serving bearer, blossoming and fruiting, spreading out in rock
and water, rising up in plant and animal. ... The sky is the vaulting path of
the sun, the course of the changing moon, the wandering glitter of the
stars, the year's seasons and their changes, the light and dusk of day, the
gloom and glow of night, the clemency and inclemency of the weather, the
drifting clouds and blue depth of the ether.... The divinities are the
beckoning messengers of the godhead. Out of the holy sway of the
godhead, the god appears in his presence or withdraws into his
concealment. ... The mortals are the human beings. They are called
mortal because they can die.... Only man dies, and indeed continually, as




It is difficult (perhaps impossible) to glean the metaphysical meaning Heidegger has in
mind in this passage.
However, the concept of dwelling and its relation to the fourfold is ofprimary
concern to Heidegger's notion of things. According to Heidegger, "[m]ortals are in the
fourfold by dwelling' (BW, 328). By dwelling, Heidegger means "to spare, to preserve"
(BW,328). Human beings dwell! preserve with a particular mode ofBeing
corresponding to each of the elements of the fourfold. According to Heidegger "[i]n
saving the earth, in receiving the sky, in awaiting the divinities, in initiating mortals,
dwelling comes to pass" (BW, 329). These modes are referred to as the "fourfold
preservation of the fourfold" (BW, 329). What they preserve is the fourfold's presence in
things; dwelling is always associated with things. Ifdwelling means "the stay ofmortals
on earth" (BW, 327), then "[dJwelling, as preserving, keeps the fourfold in that with
which mortals stay: in things" (BW, 329). Human beings dwell among things. Moreover,
the presence of the fourfold in things is dependent upon human beings: "[d)welling
preserves the fourfold by bringing the essence ofthe fourfold into things. But things
themselves secure the fourfold only when they themselves as things are let be in their
essence" (BW, 329).
This section ofBuilding Dwelling Thinking becomes more intelligible when
combined with sections ofBeing and Time. Being-in-the-world means dwelling with
things (as preserving). Heidegger takes up this notion in the third division ofBeing and
Time entitled "The Worldhood of the World". The larger ontological question of the
meaning ofBeing is to be explored within a particular phenomenological setting.
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Heidegger begins the third division by asking the question "What can be meant by
describing 'the World' as a phenomenon?" (BT, 63:91). The answer he supplies is: "[i]t
means to let us see what shows itself in 'entities' within the world" (BT, 63:91). This
phenomenological examination will ha~e both an ontical and an ontological element: the
enumeration and description of entities in the world as well as the analysis of the type of
Being which they possess. Heidegger concludes, however, that "[njeither the ontical
depiction ofentities within-the-world nor the ontological Interpretation oftheir Being is
such as to reach the phenomenon afthe 'world'" (BT, 64:92). The reason for this is that
the 'worldhood of the world' is an existentiale way ofbeing for Dasein. As Heidegger
puts it, "[0]ntologicaUy, 'world' is not a way of characterizing those entities which Dasein
essentially is not; it is rather a characteristic ofDasein itself' (BT, 64:92). It is this aspect
which is overlooked by Benso and creates problems for her proposal of an 'ethics of
things' as a supplementation ofHeidegger and Levinas.
As was the case with the fourth division, Heidegger begins his analysis by what is
'proximally and for the most part' given - the "world of everyday Dasein which is dosest
to it ... the environment' (BT, 66:94). When Dasein is 'going about its business'
involved in '''dealings' in the world and with entities within-the-world" (BT, 67:95) it
encounters equipment in its environment. Equipment has an 'in-order-to' structure - it is
used for something. Equipment has an inherent "setviceability, conduciveness, usability,
manipulability" (BT, 68:97). It is on the basis of this, that the "kind ofBeing which
equipment possesses - in which it manifests itself in its own right - we call "readiness-
to-hand' (BT, 69:98). What Dasein is concerned with primarily is not the equipment used
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as a means, but the ends to which the- equipment is put Thus, it is the work to be done
that is the focus ofDasein's circumspection. The work is ready-to-hand just like
equipment; the "work to be produced, as the 'towards-which' of such things as the
hammer, the plane, and the needle, likewise has the kind ofBeing that belongs to
equipment" (BT, 70:99).
Both equipment and the work p-reduced by its use are incorporated in a referential
totality. Any given piece of equipment is related to another - a pen, for example, is used
with a sheet of paper just as a hammer is used with a nail. Besides equipment and work,
other 'entities' are encountered in the environmental referential totality. Nature is an
entity which has a 'where-of structure - it is that out ofwhich the work is produced
through the use of equipment. Its Being, however, is not ready-to-hand; it is "pure
presence-at-hand" (BT, 70: 100). Likewise, entities with the type ofbeing ofDasein are
also discovered in the environment. The work produced is intended for someone - a
someone which has a 'for-the-sake-of structure. Both of these entities - Nature and
Dasein - are first discovered in the environment of the 'public' world of reference and
assignment.
But what concerns Heidegger most is not these entities which can be taken in a
purely ontical way; he is most concerned with the ontological basis for encountering any
of these entities in the first place. Phenomenology means "to let that which shows itselfbe
seen from itself in the very way in which it shows itself from itself' (BT, 34:58).
Phenomenology is expressed by the slogan "To the things themselves!" (BT, 34:58). The
"world is that in terms ofwhich the ready-to-hand is ready-to-hand.... [T]he world ...
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[is what] let[s] the ready-to-hand be encountered" (BT, 83: 114). What this, and the
definition of phenomenology amounts to, is that "what we encounter within-the-world
has, in its very Being, been freed for our concernful circumspection, for taking account"
(BT, 83: 114) of it. The Being ofan entity within-the-world is its involvement in the
referential totality I totality of involvements which is the world. According to Heidegger,
the "fact that it [an entity within-the-world] has such an involvement is ontologically
definitive for the Being of such an entity, and is not an ontical assertion about if' (BT,
84: 116). The world, as a totality of involvements / references, discloses the ontological
existence of what makes any reference possible. The world ultimately refers to Being-in-
the-world:
But the totality of involvements itself goes back ultimately to a 'towards-
which' in which there is no further involvement: this 'towards-which' is not
an entity with the kind ofBeing that belongs to what is ready-to-hand
within a world; it is rather an entity whose Being is defined as Being-in-the-
world, and to whose state ofBeing, worldhood itselfbelongs. This
primary 'towards-which' is not just another 'towards-this' as something in
which involvement is possible. The primary 'towards-which' is a 'for-the-
sake-of-which'. But the 'for-the-sake-of always pertains to the Being of
Dasein, for which, in its Being, that very Being is essentially an issue. We
have thus indicated the interconnection by which the structure ofan
involvement leads to Dasein's very Being as the sole authentic 'for-the-
sake-of-which' (BT, 84:116-117).
The way in which the 'late' Heidegger is bound to the 'early' Heidegger is by the
relationship between the concept of the fourfold and Being-in-the-world as letting be.
Dwelling (and the preservation it implies) is the same as letting be. The phrase 'letting
something be involved' represents an ontological existentiale. To 'let be' has both an
ontica] and an ontological sense. Ontically it means "something which is already an entity
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must be discovered in its readiness-to-hand, and that we must thus let the entity which has
this Being be encountered" (BT, 85:117). Ontologically, it means the "freeing of
everything ready-to-hand as ready-to-hand" (BT, 85: 117). Dasein frees entities within the
world by letting them be. Dasein is the "conditionfor the possibility ofdiscovering
entities which are encountered in a world with involvement (readiness-to-hand) as their
kind ofBeing, and which can thus make themselves known as they are in themselves"
(BT, 87: 120). Only because Dasein exists can entities be freed. All roads lead back to
Being.
It is on the basis ofBeing - as the condition whereby all things can be
encountered and known in themselves - that part ofBenso's proposed 'ethics of things'
runs afoul ofHeidegger. Benso contends that:
Heidegger's notion of things needs to be broadened . . . to include within
its range of signification also beings that have never been reached by any
human activity. Uncontaminated nature displays the same metaphysical
structure that the jug (or the bridge or the domesticated animal) does for
Heidegger. Therefore, it participates in an ethics of things with the same
dignity and according to the same modalities. 123
What Benso has overlooked is the fact that Dasein is required for there to be anything of
concern / significance. There can be no 'pure Nature' untouched by man because even
Nature has a relationship with Being. Nature (presence-at-hand) is discovered in the
products ofNature (ready-to-hand). As Heidegger puts it, "[t]he wood is a forest of
timber, the mountain a quarry of rock; the river is water-power, the wind is wind 'in the
sails'. (BT, 70: 100).
123 Op. cit., p. 137.
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That Benso believes things can have an ethics - akin to that ofLevinas - applied
to them, is quite evident. Things are candidates for ethical consideration because they
possess an otherness which cannot be eliminated. The fourfold is the element ofa thing
which exceeds one's grasp, thereby establishing itself as the basis for otherness.
According to Benso:
Humans are not the only inhabitants ofit [the fourfold in a thing]; other
inhabitants offer a resistance to appropriative movements that is similar, in
modes and shapes, to that offered by Levinas's Other. Not only humans
and divinities, personal presences despite their substantial difference, dwell
in the Fourfold. The earth and the sky inhabit it, too. And their resistance
to domination and objectification is as strong as that of the (im)mortal
Others.124
While it remains unclear what exactly Heidegger had in mind by the use of the tenns
'earth', 'sky', and 'divinities', it seems unlikely that they are 'personal presences' as Benso
claims. Although the 'earth' and 'sky' have been personified since ancient times, such
concepts do not meet the requirements ofLevinas for consideration as 'individual' others.
Moreover, dwelling - which preserves the presence of the fourfold in things - is a mode
ofBeing which has Dasein / Being as its origin. As such, it is not 'other'. But the process
whereby the fourfold inhabit the thing is equated by Benso with ethics. Although "it is not
possible to possess the abode of the Fourfold; it is possible, however, to inhabit it. The
proper dwelling in it, that dwelling that respects the Otherness of the co-dwellers, is
ethics. Ethics resumes its ancient significance ofdwelling place.,,12s
124 Op. cit., p. 136.
12S Ibid.
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Benso's equating ofHeidegger's 'letting be' with Levinas' ethics is not a
surprising position given the degree to which she relies upon Derrida. Many
commentators point to Heidegger's 'respect' or 'letting-be' as an analogue for Levinas'
ethical relationship with the Other. Bouckaert contends that it may be "possible to
discover a common standpoint between Levinas and Heidegger if we start from the theme
ofSein-/assen. "126 Furthermore, he claims that "goodness and justice mean, in the first
place, that we let the Other be what he is. n127 The origin ofhis claim, as well as that of
Benso, is Derrida. For Derrida, Heideggerian ontology cannot possibly do any violence to
the existent since it allows it to be as it is. As Derrida points out:
[n]ot only is the thought ofBeing not ethical violence, but it seems that no
ethics - in Levinas's sense - can be opened without it. Thought - or at
least the precomprehension ofBeing - conditions . .. the recognition of
the essence of the existence (for example someone, existent as other, as
other self, etc.). It conditions the respect for the other as what it is:
other. 128
In response, one might point out that Derrida is compacting the various aspects of
'comprehension' into a single function. Comprehension for Heidegger is composed of
three elements: pre-knowing or fore-sight, interpreting, and meaning. According to
Heidegger's Being and Time, fore-sight simply sights the object, interpretation takes what
has been sighted and specifies it "as that as which we are to take the thing in question"
126 Luk Bouckaert, "Ontology and Ethics: Reflections on Levinas' Critique of
Heidegger," International Philosophical Quarterly, X (1970), 414.
127 Ibid.
128 Jacques Derrida, Writing and Difference (Chicago: University ofChicago Press:
1978), pp. 137-138.
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(BT, 149: 189), and meaning combines the entity with the Being ofDasein in order for it to
be understood. Before Derrida's respect for the other 'as what it is' can occur, there has
to be a sighting. That is, Derrida's respect occurs at the level of interpretation not fore-
sight or precomprehension. The way in which the entity which is Other is sighted is
against the horizon ofBeing. Thus Levinas writes that:
Comprehension for Heidegger ultimately rests on the opening ofbeing ...
like a vacancy awaiting its incumbent, opened by the very fact that a being
is. . . . It is thus that Heidegger describes in their most formal structure, the
articulations of vision where the relation of the subject with the object is
subordinated to the relation of the object with light, which is not an object.
The understanding of a being will thus consist in going beyond the being,
into the openness, and in perceiving it within the horizon ofbeing. In
other word, comprehension, as constructed by Heidegger, rejoins the great
tradition ofWestern philosophy wherein to comprehend the particular
being is already to place oneselfbeyond the particular, which alone exists,
by knowledge which is always knowledge of the universal (IOF, 124).
Levinas is not opposed to comprehension, but the structure of comprehension. The fact
that comprehension / letting be is dependent upon Dasein / Being, eliminates any
conception of 'otherness' in the object of comprehension. Pre-knowing or fore-sight
involves Dasein 'sighting' the 'thing' against a horizon ofBeing in which it participates.
Interpretation likewise occurring against the horizon of Being and meaning is always
dependent upon Dasein. All aspects of comprehension amount to a reduction of the other
to the same; "knowledge or vision ... is an act that in some way appropriates the 'seen' to
itself, integrates it into a world by endowing it with signification" (TI, 195).
For Heidegger, Being is the 'end-all, be-all'. That is, "Being and the structures of
Being lie beyond every entity and every possible character which an entity may possess.
Being is the transcendens pure and simple" (BT, 37:61). Thus, when Heidegger writes
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that the "task ofontology is to explain Being itself and to make the Being ofentities stand
out in full relief' (BT, 27:49), the fact that the Being of entities stands out in/till relie/is
not a mere 'figure of speech'. Entities are known because ofthe Being which Dasein
possesses. That being the case, they do not have a concept ofotherness which Levinas
would recognize. As Levinas puts it, although "knowledge remains disinterested, it is
nevertheless marked by the way the knowing being has approached the Real. To
recognize truth to be disclosure is to refer it to the horizon ofhim who discloses. . . . The
disclosed being is relative to us and not leete' etlYtO" (TI, 64). Comprehension does not
violate the 'letting the thing be' aspect of the definition of phenomenology, it violates the
'from itself aspect.
As noted above, reduction of the Other to the same can be accomplished in three
different ways: the' object' may be considered a concept, a sensation, or Being. As
Levinas points out, "[k]nowledge is always an adequation between thought and what it
thinks" (EI, 60). Heidegger considers adequation and correspondence in section 44 of
Being and Time: 'Dasein, Disclosedness, and Truth'. Claiming that the "characterization
of truth as 'agreement', adaequatio, 0IlO(WOt<:;, is very general and empty" (BT,
215:258), Heidegger concludes that "the 'definition' of ,truth' ... [is] 'uncoveredness'
and ... 'Being-uncovering'" (BT, 220:263). Earlier, Heidegger used a similar concept in
reference to entities discovered within the world of concern / circumspection;
'''[d]isclose' and 'disclosedness' ... shall signify 'to Jay open' and 'the character ofhaving
been laid open'" (BT, 75: 105). Heidegger summarizes the relationship between these
tenns and truth in the foHowing way:
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Uncovering is a wa.y ofBeing for Being-in-the-world. Circumspective
concern, or even that concern in which we tarry and look at something,
uncovers entities within-th.e-world. These entities become that which has
been uncovered. They are <true' in a second sense. What is primarily
<true' - that is, uncovering - is Dasein. 'Truth' in the second sense does
not mean Being-uncovering (uncovering), but Being-uncovered
(uncoveredness) (BT, 220:263).
The truth of an <object' uncovered / disclosed in the world is secondary to the truth of the
Being which does the uncovering I disclosing. Thus, Levinas' first means of reduction
(knowledge) is supplanted by the third (Being) in Heidegger's ontology.
In his discussion ofDescartes, Heidegger entertains then dismisses the notion of
sensation. In traditional ontology (ofwhich Descartes is not only the founder but also
member) "the way to get a genuine grasp ofwhat really is has been decided in advance: it
lies in VO€lV - [which Heidegger interprets as] <beholding' in the widest sense" (BT,
96:129). If sensation is a type of 'beholding', then it is related to such concepts as 'letting
be', <uncovering' and 'disclosing'. Sensation is a "possible way of access to entities by a
beholding which is perceptual in character" (BT, 86: 129). But as the Wax Analogy
shows, what is uncovered / discovered is the ontical aspect of"this waxen Thing which is
coloured, flavoured, hard, and cold" (BT, 96: 129). What sensation cannot reveal is the
ontological Being of the Thing itself. The ontical which is revealed by sensation "is not of
any importance ontologicaUy" (BT, 96: 129). Thus, "[t]he senses do not enable us to
cognize any entity in its Being~ they merely serve to announce the ways in which 'external'
Things within-the-world are useful or harmful for human creatures encumbered with
bodies.... [T]hey tell us nothing about entities in their Being" (BI, 96-97:) 29). Because
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sensation is not ontologically adequate to the task ofrevealing the Being ofthings, it is not
an appropriate means ofuncovering I disclosing.
In the end, it is Being alone which is primary when one is concerned with the
disclosure I uncovering of things. According to Levinas, "[o]bjects have no light of their
own; they receive a borrowed light" (TI, 74) from Dasein which does the revealing I
disclosing. Thus, "something one encounters ... from the very fact that it is illuminated
[by Being] one encounters it as if it came from us [who are beings]. It does not have a
fundamental strangeness" (TO, 65) sufficient for it to be considered Other based upon
'alterity'. For Levinas, phenomenology ofthe Other does not occur in comprehension but
in expression; the thing is not disclosed against the horizon ofBeing, it expresses itself
As Levinas writes, the "other qua other is the Other. To 'let him be' the relationship of
discourse is required; pure 'disclosure' ... does not respect him enough for that" (TI, 71).
The 'philosophy ofthe Neuter' shows itself again in Heidegger's phenomenological
analysis of things. Levinas writes that the "exaltation of the Neuter may present itself as
the anteriority of the We with respect to the I, of the situation with respect to the beings in
situation" (TI, 298). In the preceding chapter, the sociality proposed by Heidegger was
rejected because it failed to recognize the alterity of the Other (person). Now, Being-in-
the-world as the uncovering I disclosing ofthings - the situation (world I Being-in-the-
world) with respect to the being in the situation (things encountered within-the-world)-
also fails to respect alterity.
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Levinas on Things
IfHeideggerian disclosure destroys the alterity of things, Levinasian enjoyment
preserves it. "It is interesting to observe", writes Levinas, "that Heidegger does not take
the relation to enjoyment into consideration" (TI, 134). It is in the second section of
Totality and Infinity - entitled "Interiority and Economy" - that Levinas considers the
concept of' enjoyment'. This section, according to Peperzak, amounts to "a correction of
Heidegger's description ofDasein 's being-in-the-world ,,129 It is for this reason that there
is a 'duality' about this section of Totality and Infinity - one which a careful reading will
discern and ofwhich Benso was evidently unaware. This section contains both a
characterization ofHeidegger's system as well as Levinas' original thought. Since it
characterizes (and criticizes) Heidegger, many of the claims Benso attaches to Levinas
should be directed to Heidegger. For the purposes of this thesis, this section represent a
substitution for Heidegger's conception of things - one which should prove acceptable to
Benso thereby negating the need for a supplementation ofLevinas and Heidegger.
Levinas begins the section by distinguishing his work from that ofHeidegger; "[iJn
contradistinction to the philosophers of existence we will not found the relation with the
existent respected in its being, and in this sense absolutely exterior, that is, metaphysical
[the Other], on being in the world, the care and doing characteristic of the Heideggerian
Dasein" (TI, 109). Transcendence is the basis for making such a distinction. As Peperzak
129 Adriaan Peperzak, To The Other: An Introduction to the Philosophy of
Emmanuel Levinas (West Lafayette, Indiana: Purdue University Press, 1993), p. 147.
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puts it, "[w]hereas ... being-in-the-world reducers] transcendence to the immanence ofan
all-embracing unity [Being], the metaphysical relation [ofLevinas] is a real
transcendence. "130 Thus, there is a "di,fference that separates the relations analogous to
transcendence from those oftranscendence itself' (TI, 109) - a difference that separates
Heidegger from Levinas.
The relationship between a being and things cannot be characterized solely as an
equipmental relationship as presented in Heidegger's Being-in-the-world. There are
certain things which are not equipment. These Levinas designates as the "things we live
from [and they] are not tools, nor implements, in the Heideggerian sense of the term.
Their existence is not exhausted by the utilitarian schematism that delineates them as
having the existence ofhammers, needles, and machines" (TI, 110). An alternative
designation for such items is "objects of enjoyment" (TI, 100). Objects of enjoyment are
not simply the means to procure the continued existence of a being; they "are not always
indispensable to it for the maintenance ofthat life, as means or as the fuel necessary for the
'functioning' of existence" (TI, 111). Objects of enjoyment are not sought because they
continue a being's existence but because they are enjoyable. The means (food as
necessary for continued life) becomes an end (sought because they are enjoyable, not
because they continue life). It is not as if a being first becomes aware that certain things
are required for its continued existence; in the first instance, things are objects of
enjoyment. As such, they do not have the type of difference necessary to qualify them as
Other - alterity. According to Levinas, "[n]ourishment ... is the transmutation of the
130 Op. cit. 149.
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other into the same, which is the essence ofenjoyment" (TI, 111). As Peperzak reiterates,
the otherness ofan object / thing is "a nonabsolute but relative and integratable otherness
- [one which] is 'transmuted' in the Same ... They are assimilated.... Enjoyment is
always appropriation, assimilation, stilling of need."131 According to Beavers, "the world
loses its alterity in the satisfaction ofa need."132
There is a 'higher order' non-cognitive element to the structure of enjoyment. In
enjoyment, "there is a relation with an object and at the same time a relation with this
relation" (TI, Ill). One :fills one's life not only with objects which furthers one's life, but
with objects one enjoys - which add to one's life in a way that is similar to, but distinct
from, the way one continues life. Thus, Levinas writes that "[e]njoyment is precisely the
way the act nourishes itself with its own activity" (TI, 111). This structure is reflected in
the notion of desire, mentioned above. Again Levinas writes that "[l]ife is not the naked
will to be, an ontological Sorge for this life. Life's relation with the very condition ofits
life becomes the nourishment and content of that life. Life is love oflife, a relation with
contents that are not my being ... Distinct from my substance but constituting it" (TI,
122). The reference to Sorge summons up Heidegger who might translate this passage in
the following manner: 'Dasein's relation with things is a relation with an entity that does
not have the being ofDasein - yet the being ofthings (which do not have existence)
constitutes the existence ofDasein,. How curious.
131 Op. cit., p. 151.
132 Beavers, p. 70.
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The dual nature ofthe enjoyment inherent in life, sounds a .Iot like the first
definition ofDasein as:
an entity which does not just occur among other entities. Rather it is
ontically distinguished by the fact that, in its very Being, that Being is an
issue for it. But in that case, this is a constitutive state ofDasein's Being,
and this implies that Dasein, in its Being, has a relationship towards that
Being - a relationship which itself is one ofBeing. And this means further
that there is some way in which Dasein understands itself in its Being, and
that to some degree it does so explicitly. It is peculiar to this entity that
with and through its Being, this Being is disclosed to it. Understanding of
Being is itselfa definite characteristic ofDasein 's Being (BT, 12:32).
Heidegger locates the generation of the individual Dasein (self) in the ontological
distinction characterized by this definition. What Levinas does with enjoyment is establish
a moment prior to Dasein which constitutes an individual (self). As Peperzak points out,
the "circularity oflife's enjoying itselfis typical for the pretheoretical and prepractical
consciousness ofa solitary ego taken on its most basic level."133 Enjoyment is what first
individuates a being into an 'ego'. In order for there to be an enjoyment of life rather than
simply living life as continued existence, there must be an 'ego'. Individuation occurs at a
pre-cognitive level; "[e]njoyment ... is not yet the level of reflection" (TI, 113). As
Levinas puts it, enjoyment or "livingfrom . .. is not simply becoming conscious ofwhat
fills life" (TI, 111) - before a being knows that it is alive or what that life constitutes, it is
hungry. According to Peperzak, an ego "is concerned and takes care of itself before it
becomes conscious of itself."134
133 Peperzak, p. lSI.
134 Op. cit., p. 150.
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Although a being is dependent on things for its continued existence, it is not
subordinated to them. It is through enjoyment that the individual gains its independence
from the world. According to Levinas, "[w]hat we live from does not enslave us; we
enjoy if' (TI, 114). A need is not a simple lack but the possibility for satisfaction, an
opportunity for the ego to enjoy itself The ego is capable of"mastery in this dependence"
(TI, 114). According to Peperzak, "[d]ependence on (nonabsolute but relative) otherness
and independence from it are the two sides of a freedom that shows its mastery in
possession, consumption, and exploitation."13S The ego, alone in the world because it has
found nothing other than itself (or what can be converted into itself) - no Other-
becomes master of the universe. The ego becomes the "I can" (TI, 117). The ego which
is "[c]onfronted with the 'world' ofconsumptive and useful things and constellations, the
corporeal subject experiences itself as an 'I can' ... for which the world spreads OUt.,,136
Referring to the linguistic relationship between 'I can' and Heidegger's 'Sein-k6nnen',
Peperzak contends that the ego thus described is essentially the same as Dasein.
Enjoyment, like the ontological distinction, "is a withdrawal into oneself, an involution"
(TI, 118). .As Levinas writes, in "enjoyment I am absolutely for mysef Egoist without
reference to the Other, I am alone ... Not against the Others, not 'as for me... ' - but
entirely deaf to the Other, outside ofall communication and all refusal to communicate -
without ears, like a hungry stomach" (TI, 134). The 'free reign' of the ego which
discovers nothing in the world which can limit it, is called into question only by the
mOp. cit., p. 152.
136 Op. cit., pp. 152-153.
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appearance of the Other; "the critical presence of the Other will call into question this
egoism" (TI, 119).
More than simply preceding the use ofequipment, enjoyment also occurs at the
level of equipment. All objects, whether they be tools or not, are objects of enjoyment.
According to Levinas:
Every object offers itself to enjoyment, a universal category of the
empirical- even ifl lay hold ofan object-implement, ifl handle it as a
Zeug. The handling and utilization of tools, the recourse to all the
instrumental gear of life, whether to fabricate other tools or to render
things accessible, concludes in enjoyment. As material or gear the objects
ofeveryday use are subordinated to enjoyment . . . Things refer to my
enjoyment. This is an observation as commonplace as could be, which the
analyses of Zeughaftigkeit do not succeed in effacing. (TI, 132-133).
One uses a piece ofequipment but also enjoys the use of it. Levinas' conception of
enjoyment supplements Heidegger's notion of equipment. According to Levinas, the
"enjoyment of a thing, be it a tool, does not consist simply in bringing this thing to the
usage for which it was fabricated - the pen to writing, the hammer to the nail to be
driven in·- but also in suffering or rejoicing over this operation" (TI, 133).
Peperzak writes that to "enjoy life is neither a vis-a.-vis with regard to the objects
nor a participation - by handling tools or following signs - in a network of references; it
is much more primitive, but all instrumentality and representation are rooted in it.,,137
What makes enjoyment 'more primitive' than the use of implements is the relationship that
things have with what Levinas calls the 'elemental'. It is the 'elemental' which could
provide Benso with a Levinasian concept - akin to Heidegger's fourfold - which could
137 Op. cit., p. 155.
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account for the 'other' status of things. The way in which things are presented to an ego
for enjoyment is from a background - which is not Being - medium called the
'elemental'. The elemental "is not reducible to a system ofoperational references and is
not equivalent to the totality ofsuch a system" (TI, 131). That is, the elemental is not the
Heideggerian environmental world and is not Being. A possession is what has been
removed from the elemental and converted into a thing. This resembles Benso' s claim that
possession is made possible only through "a perversion of the nature of things - from
things to objects.,,138 She contends that "[i]t is not possible to possess that abode."139 just
as Levinas maintains that the elemental is "the non-possessable" (TI, 131). For Benso,
although "it is not possible to possess the abode of the Fourfold; it is possible, however, to
inhabit it.,,14O For Levinas, the elemental is "a medium: one is steeped in it; I am always
within the element" (TI, 131). Benso's objection to Heidegger - that there is no
'unspoiled nature' - is answered by Levinas. The sailor "who makes use of the sea and
the wind dominates these elements but does not thereby transform them into things. They
retain the indetermination of elements" (TI, 131).
Benso claims that Levinas has no conception of things. According to her, either:
He encounters them within the economy of the Same, within a movement
(of labor, of enjoyment) that takes its bearings from the Same and returns
to the Same. Or he encounters them as gifts, as the offer that the Same
makes to the Other to welcome her/him, to cover her/his nakedness, and to
enact the ethical relationship. It is the Other, however, who constitutes the




principle of the donation, not the things themselves. That is, for Levinas
there is no Otherness of things. 141
Insofar as enjoyment is meant to capture Heidegger's notion ofBeing-in-the-world, Benso
is correct. However, this claim ought to be made - and is made by Levinas - against
Heidegger. Insofar as things are gifts offered to the Other, Benso is correct: this is
determined by the Other and not the things themselves. This does not, however, eliminate
the possibility that Levinas has an acceptable conception of the otherness of things. If
Benso is willing to accept Heidegger's fourfold, then she should accept Levinas'
elemental.
In addition to the status ofthings (its proposed otherness), Benso is concerned
with the appropriate response. According to Benso, "[t]hings ... can be experiences,
enjoyed, even possessed, if only through a specific modality of possession that comes into
contact without possessing, so that possession is never totalized. This modality ... is the
touching mode oftendemess."142 Benso proposes 'tenderness' as a relationship between a
being and a thing which does not reduce the alterity of the thing. That is, tenderness is a
sort of respect for alterity akin to ethics. According to Benso, "[w]hat cannot be
possessed, what tenderness respects and preserves, is the fullness of presencing. In other
words, a thing is richer than the sound, the smelt, the taste of it the I may - and does
indeed - enjoy."143
141 Op. cit., p. 132.
1420p. cit., p. 137.
143 Ibid.
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Two concepts in Levinas - 'gentleness' and the 'caress' - are possible origins
for Benso's 'tenderness'. In Totality and Infinity Levinas refers to a mode of 'gentleness'.
It is in 'gentleness' as a sort of 'intentional structure' that the Other is revealed. But the
intentional structure ofgentleness originates with the Other, not the self; "gentleness
comes to the separated being iTom the Other. The Other precisely reveals himselfin his
alterity ... as the primordial phenomenon ofgentleness" (TI, 150). In Time and the
Other, however, Levinas proposes the caress as an intentional mode originating from the
self. He writes that the "caress is a mode of the subject's being, where the subject ...
[comes] in contact with another" (TO, 89). It is not properly speaking a contact like
sensation for it "goes beyond this contact" (TO, 89). It is more like desire, mentioned
above. The caress "feeds on countless hungers" (TO, 89) because it cannot be satisfied by
what is aimed at in such an intentional state. The Other cannot be possessed. In this way,
the caress is not a type of grasping, possessing, or knowing; "[i]f one could possess,
grasp, and know the other, it would not be other. Possessing, knowing, and grasping are
synonyms of power" (TO, 90).
While it seems plausible that the caress is a mode of being which respects the
otherness of things, Benso is correct when she contends that 'Levinas has no things'. The
reason for this, as much of this thesis above demonstrates, is because things do not
possess alterity. That is, in many different ways - both by Heidegger and Levinas - the
otherness of things can, and indeed is, converted into the Same. The Other as person is
the onJy true Other - that which cannot be converted into the Same. As Beavers puts it,
"the alterity of person and that of things is significantly different. Persons resist
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possessio~ things do not. Because of this difference, persons are the types of beings that
can be violated, while things are not."!«
While it is true that things represent a type ofotherness, they do not possess
alterity for they can be, and are, converted into the Same. It may be true that human
beings are 'compelled' to 'respond' to the 'demands' placed upon them by things, as
Benso claims. However, the 'demands' of things and the 'response' to them are not
ethical in nature. The reason why ethics cannot be expanded to include things is because
of the nature ofethics and thing; ethics is tied to alterity and things lack alterity.
Moreover, the relationship to things (as proposed by Levinas) involves an inversion of
need into mastery. That is, the demands placed upon a being by things is inverted into a
mastery of things by being.
144 Beavers, p. 70.
CHAPTER IV
CONCLUDING REMARKS
The conclusion of this thesis is not that supplementation ofHeidegger and Levinas
is impossible, only that Benso's article fails to accomplish this task. Benso is correct that
Levinas has an ethics. In fact, he proposes the very foundation ofethics - the encounter
with the Other. For Levinas, and by extension all ethics, the focal point is the Other. Yet
not any otherness will do. Levinas is primarily concerned with alterity - the type of
Otherness which cannot be reduced to me, the ego, the Same. Individuation for Levinas is
made possible by alterity - only on the basis of there being something different (the
Other) can the Same be said to be. In the instant that the Same encounters an Other,
ethics is born. Only on the basis of alterity can there be both a Same and ethics.
It is this concept ofalterity which Levinas understood but Heidegger lacks, that
prevents the latter from having an ethics. Heidegger's Dasein is an entity that individuates
itself through the ontological distinction between Being and beings. The way in which
Dasein takes hold of its being detennines it as a being. The most authentic way Dasein
takes hold of its being is through death. Rather than an element which would be
comparable to Levinas' alterity, death represents the impossibiHty ofDasein's possibilities.
Facing death is the most individual of actions and it individualizes Dasein. Thus,
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individuation is a-social - it involves no other being than the one in question. As it turns
out, however, Heidegger maintains that Being-with is always a part ofDasein's being. As
such, a being is never alone whether it finds another being or not. Whatever Dasein
discovers in the world (which is part of,its own Being) is contained in a referential totality
- the center ofwhich is the individual Dasein. IfDasein encounters other, it is as another
Dasein - not as anything fundamentally different than itself Moreover, the relationship
with others is mediated - by the world, by work, by Being-with. Ultimately, there is no
alterity in a Heideggerian universe because there is only Being. Alterity I the Other is
something that is beyond Being. Thus, Heidegger not only does not have an ethics but his
ontology precludes an ethics from ever developing.
Benso claims that her supplementation 'reaches further' than Levinasian ethics-
all the way to things. What Levinas maintains, however, is that ethics can neither be
derived from nor applied to things for they lack alterity. In this sense, Levinas lacks things
- not in the sense of not having any or not considering them. What Benso means is that
Levinas' concept of the Other cannot be applied to things. She looks to Heidegger's
conception of the Fourfold for an analogue to Levinas' alterity. If the Fourfold is beyond
possession, then this amounts to an alterity that Levinas might accept. So long as
Heidegger's conception of things is analyzed only according to the Fourfold, it may
contain something akin to Levinas' alterity. However, the Fourfold relates to Being-in as
Being-in-the-world and dwelling. An analysis ofBeing-in-the-world results, however, in a
denial not only of a concept ofalterity but also Benso's proposed supplementation. Since
all things are interconnected in a totality of references, they ultimately lead back to
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Dasein's Being. In this sense, the otherness of things is reduced to the Same (Being).
Dasein is the ultimate 'for-the-sake-of-which' all other things are. In the end, even
Heidegger does not have a concept of things which recognizes their otherness.
Insofar as Levinas' consideration of things represents a characterization and
correction ofHeidegger's being-in-the-world, it represents both a denial and an
affinnation of the otherness of things. The denial occurs in Levinas' characterization of
Heidegger's way of conceiving things. The affinnation occurs in two places: the fact that
a thing is an object of enjoyment prior to Heidegger's being-in-the-world and with the
proposal of the elemental as the medium out ofwhich possessions (as a modification of
things) come. Ifone were to judge Levinas according to alterity, however, then Benso is
correct in maintaining that Levinas does not recognize the Otherness of things.
What Benso has in mind by an ethics of things is almost as incomprehensible as
what Heidegger means by the Fourfold. Ifher aim is to establish an ethical responsibility
for things - even Nature or the environment as a whole - then such an endeavor is futile
if the basis is Heidegger or Levinas (or even some supplementation of the two). As the
title of this thesis implies, either ethics and things never intersect because of alterity
(Levinas) or all roads lead to Being (Heidegger). If either the fonner or the latter is the
case, then there can be no ethics of things. The supplementation ofLevinas and
Heidegger is an interesting proposal for philosophical analysis. However, the way in
which it is attempted by Benso proves fruitless.
Perhaps an alternative supplementation would join Levinas before and after
Heidegger. Levinas' pre-cognitive, pre-conscious moment ofenjoyment is the antecedent
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to a Dasein that finds itself thrown into its world and operates according to being-in-the-
world. The implication here is that Dasein individuates itself at the level of consciousness
and cognition - at the level it can have issues I concerns, understand itself in its own
being, and disclose its own being to itself Levinas' person is much 'younger' or, perhaps,
more primitive I elemental. Heidegger's being-in-the-world serves as a good basis for
understanding how Dasein operates in it everyday life. But as it operates in the world (or
even authentically) it finds no Other. Heidegger therefore needs posterior
supplementation as well. Thus, Heidegger's ontology can be supplemented with Levinas'
ethics. This seems to be an adequate supplementation ofLevinas and Heidegger - one
which is preferable to that ofBenso.
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